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PART I.

REPLY BRIEF

Cross-appellee McCorvey's brief in response to UDOT's numerous
legal issues is replete with fabrications and distortions of the
record evidence.

In addition, much of the brief raises material

irrelevant to the issues in this cross-appeal and appeal.1

UDOT

*In one inflammatory example, McCorvey singlehandedly accuses,
tries, and convicts UDOT employee Berry for the death of a young
woman driving through a chip-resealing zone on 1-70 several days
after McCorvey's accident (McCorvey Opening Brief at 11 n.5).
McCorvey does not mention that the witness, David Merchant, also
said she "was going too fast." Nor does he provide evidence of
details of that subsequent accident, which merely demonstrate that
McCorvey was not the only foolish young driver willing to risk life
and limb by speeding in a construction area with an obviously
hazardous driving surface: The young woman, driving 80-85 mph,
came up behind a line of cars travelling in the left lane "at slow
and prudent speeds." Instead of slowing and following behind, she
pulled into the right hand lane, lost control, and went down an
embankment (R. 3004 at 86). UDOT has found no evidence that the
right lane at that point, although newly chipped, was "unswept."

refers the Court to its opening brief, which contains record
citations to support its marshalling of pertinent evidence.

The

following points, however, require a reply and clarification.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Once a case has been heard and tried on a particular theory in
the trial court, the parties on appeal are restricted to that
theory. Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702, 705 (1971)
(plaintiff/appellant); Hill v. Mayers, 104 Or. App. 629, 802 P.2d
694, 696 (1990) (plaintiff/appellant); Yellow Cab Co. v. Allen, 377
P.2d 220 (Okl. 1962) (plaintiff/appellee); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98
Wash. 2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982) (plaintiff/appellant) . As this
Court has held, a party may not, for the first time on appeal,
inject

into

liability:

the

case a new theory upon which

to predicate

"Orderly procedure . . . requires that a party must

present his entire case and his theory or theory of recovery to the
trial court; and having done so, he cannot thereafter change to
some different theory[.]" Wagner, 482 P.2d at 705 (quoting Simpson
v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970));
accord Wilson, 656 P.2d at 1033 (theory of negligence per se not
argued in trial court could not be raised on appeal).
The bulk of McCorvey's response to UDOT's insufficiency claims
hinges on his insertion of new theories of UDOT's negligence, other
than that involving the traffic control plan used on this project,
that were not presented to the jury for determination.

The jury

was never informed of the vague allegation in his complaint that
UDOT "and/or LeGrand" had negligently failed to properly pave,
2

compact or maintain the surface of 1-15 (Separate Record in C881818 at 0006).

In any event, this provision in the complaint

alleges negligence generally but does not articulate any specific
theory of negligence*
McCorvey

also never

claimed

to the

jury that

UDOT was

negligent in failing to inspect (or had negligently inspected) the
contractor's implementation of the traffic control plan on the
highway or its sweeping of gravel from the chipped and rolled
No such negligence claims were ever pleaded against UDOT,2

lanes.

and no such claims were argued to the jury for its resolution.
Furthermore,

the

jury

was

never

instructed

that

negligent

resurfacing of the lanes or negligent inspection of the project
were alternative theories of McCorvey's negligence case against
UDOT.

In fact, no instruction explained to the jury any theory of

UDOT's negligence.

Instead, the jury was simply told:

"Plaintiff

claims that each of the defendants were [sic] negligent, and the
negligence of each defendant was a proximate cause of plaintiff [sj
injuries."

(Jury Instruction 20, R. 02546). With regard to UDOT,

part II of the special verdict form (R. 02522) simply asked the
jurors:

2

The Governmental Immunity Act retains immunity for injury
arising "out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of
making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(d) (1989).

3

(A) Was the State of Utah negligent in one or
more of the particulars claimed by the
plaintiff?
ANSWER:
Yes
No
(B) If 11(A) is "yes", was such negligence a
proximate cause of the accident?
ANSWER:
Yes
No
In closing argument, the jurors were finally told exactly what
UDOT had done that was unreasonable. According to McCorvey,

this

accident was caused by a lack of traffic control and would have
been prevented by closing the outside right lane until after it had
been swept (R. 3008 at 50). The number one duty here, the duty
superior to the drivers' duty to use safe speeds, was for the State
of Utah to have a traffic plan for motorists that told drivers what
to do and where to go
themselves and others."

"because we are protecting
(R. 3008 at 54, 56).

them from

Because the

witnesses who had driven the project that day reached different
conclusions from the traffic control signage about what lane they
should travel in and what speed they should travel, McCorvey's
counsel continued, the State and the contractor must have violated
their "duty to warn of hazards" and the "duty to keep motorists
travelling that roadway carefully.
that's negligence."

And ladies and gentlemen,

(R. 3008 at 60).

McCorvey's counsel then proceeded to walk the jurors through
the special verdict form: Was LeGrand Johnson Construction Company
negligent in one or more of the particulars claimed by plaintiff?
Yes.

It had the duty to come up with the traffic control plan.

They were supposed to broom the gravel off the shoulder and the
4

highway and they didn't do it.

They were there every day, they

knew how people were driving, and they knew people were driving at
55 mph (R. 3008 at 63). And this negligence was a proximate cause
because but/for that failure to control traffic, there wouldn't
have been an accident.
McCorvey's

Id.

counsel then immediately moved

on to address

briefly part II of the verdict form:
Was the State negligent? That is the next question.
Yes. They came up with the plan. That wasn't the . So
their negligence is not as great as the contractor's.
Id. at 63-64 (emphasis added).

"They came up with the plan."

these

articulated

six

words,

plaintiff

to

the

jury

In
the

"particulars" of his theory of negligence against UDOT referred to
in the special verdict form.

He then moved on to other issues,

never to return to any alternative theories of UDOT's negligence.
Having tried and argued his negligence case against UDOT to
the jury on the sole theory that its traffic control plan was
deficient, and having obtained from the jury an affirmative answer
only to the question "Was the State negligent in approving this
traffic control plan?", McCorvey may not on appeal reinvent his
lawsuit and pretend that the jurors answered other questions they
were never asked.

Thus, to the extent McCorvey's opening brief

purports to marshall "evidence" of negligence by UDOT other than
that related to the traffic control plan, it should be disregarded.
The only UDOT negligence found by the jury was negligence in
approving a traffic control plan it found deficient, either because
the jury found the signs in the plan were inadequate to warn of the

5

loose gravel hazard or because the plan failed to close the unswept
outside lane until after sweeping (see UDOT's Opening Brief at 2829).

It is only this negligence by UDOT that can be considered in

determining whether the evidence is sufficient, as a matter or law,
to

support

the

jury's

finding

proximate cause of the accident

that UDOT's

negligence was a

(Special Verdict Part IIB, R.

02522).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Overview
All the "factual" assertions in McCorvey's brief made without

citation to the record
24(a)(7) and
including

(e) of

for verification as required by Rule

the Utah Rules

of Appellate

all of Section A of McCorvey's

Statement

Procedure,
of Facts

(McCorvey Opening Brief at 4-5), should be disregarded.

See

Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978).
B.

UDOT "Assuming" Liability and Fault3 at Trial
Throughout

his brief, McCorvey

states

that UDOT made a

conscious tactical decision to shoulder responsibility for this
accident in order to exculpate the contractor and thereby deprive
McCorvey of more of the contractor's

six million dollars of

insurance coverage (e.g.. McCorvey Opening Brief at 6, 7 & nn. 2-3,
58).

McCorvey also contends it is a fact that UDOT attempted to
3

Contrary to McCorvey's assertion (McCorvey Opening Brief at
7 n.5), UDOT does not claim that the jury should have assigned more
fault to the contractor. One of UDOT's arguments in its Opening
Brief was that there was no substantial evidence to support the
jury's finding that McCorvey was less at fault than UDOT for this
accident. This argument has, however, been withdrawn by UDOT, infra
at 22-23.
6

"skew the
accident"

jury verdict
and that

it

by accepting

responsibility

"deliberately" destroyed

for this

the insurance

coverage protection held by the contractor for McCorvey's benefit
(id. at 35, 38-39).

These assertions are pure fantasy, bordering

on deliberate misrepresentation.

The "evidence" in Section B and

elsewhere that McCorvey cuts and pastes to prove to this Court a
conspiracy theory that was not the subject of factfinding in the
trial court should, therefore, be disregarded.
It was UDOT's position that this unfortunate accident was not
the result of a defective traffic control plan or deficient traffic
control implementation or misapplication of gravel chips by the
contractor.

Instead, it was caused solely by McCorvey's reckless

speeding and racing with another reckless driver, Wright, in an
obvious construction project that employed loose gravel as the
resurfacing material (see Jury Instruction 32, R. 2560-61).

In

UDOT's view, McCorvey was blaming the supposed deep pockets, UDOT
and the contractor, as scapegoats to recover for the costly
consequences of his own bad judgment (R. 3009 at 75-83; R. 3008 at
66).

Nonetheless, the jury found independent negligence by both

UDOT and by the contractor, and UDOT must live with those factual
findings, which are not challenged in its cross-appeal.
It was McCorvey's decision to sue UDOT for its own independent
negligence in approving a traffic control plan that permitted
speeds up to 55 mph on the unswept but rechipped right lane and did
not physically close that lane off after sweeping.

McCorvey told

the jurors UDOT was thereby responsible for his injuries, though
7

less so than the contractor (R. 3008 at 63); they responded by
finding UDOT 28% at fault and the contractor 50%.
Although

McCorvey

pointedly

told

the

jurors

in

closing

argument (R. 3008 at 63) and in Instruction 34 (R. 02563) that he
would recover nothing if they found his fault to be 50% or more,
McCorvey never told them UDOT's ultimate financial liability for
its share of the fault was limited by statute (challenged in his
appeal and responded to below in Part II).4 Although McCorvey may
now, because of this limit, regret bringing UDOT into this lawsuit
at

all

or

regret

that

his

jury didn't

apportion

a greater

percentage of fault to the highly insured contractor and a smaller
percentage to UDOT, that is the calculated risk he ran by arguing
to the jury that UDOT was negligent and at fault.
C.

The Amount of Gravel
In Section C, McCorvey presents evidence about loose gravel on

the shoulder of the swept inside lane and the unswept outside lane
of 1-15 at the accident site. UDOT presented this evidence of the
gravel throughout its brief (e.g., at 12-18, 22-25), including
A

In another misrepresentation, McCorvey states that, by taking
responsibility onto itself and away from the contractor and then
invoking the $250,000 statutory damage limit, UDOT was able to use
the statute to shield the contractor and reduce "the amount that
LeGrand Johnson was required to indemnify the State." (McCorvey
Opening Brief at 58 n.42). McCorvey made a similar accusation in
the trial court and it went nowhere because, as he is well aware,
there is no indemnity agreement between UDOT and LeGrand that would
lead to such a result (R. 2999 at 15, 63, 64; R. 3000 at 8, 13).
The standard indemnity agreement required by Section 107.14 of
Utah' s Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction (R.
02636) is relevant only if UDOT has paid out monies, under a
vicarious liability theory, for injury caused by the contractor's
negligence, not its own (Transcript of December 7, 1990 at 21, 2526).
8

plaintiff's expert's opinion that McCorvey lost control of his
vehicle when his front wheels entered a 1 and 1/2" ridge of gravel
at the edge of the shoulder of the inside (left) lane.

McCorvey,

however, mistakenly characterizes all testimony and other evidence
concerning loose gravel as proof of "excessive" gravel.5
As explained in UDOT's opening brief, the chip seal process of
highway resurfacing involves putting down a thick layer of loose
gravel and rolling the loose chips into a sticky emulsion.

After

rolling, most of the remaining loose chips are swept off the
roadway. The faster you drive over a newly rechipped roadway, even
if it has been swept, the more gravel chips you pull up out of the
emulsion and send flying at any cars nearby.

You can hear the

gravel hit the wheel wells and undercarriage of your own car, you
can see the chips being thrown up by other cars, and you can hear
the chips tossed up by others that hit your car's exterior (R. 2998
at 206).
UDOT has never disputed that there was loose gravel in the

5

Like McCorvey, UDOT encourages members of the Court to
actually look at all the photographs of the accident site (Exs. 3
and 4, included as Addendum Item J to UDOT's Opening Brief). Exs.
3k-m, 3o, 3z, 3x, 3z and 4c, photos taken where McCorvey lost
control and went into the median, indisputably show some loose
gravel chips, but not more than one would reasonably expect in a
chip seal resurfacing zone. In Ex. 3k-m, the tops of the 2" high
tabs are clearly visible as temporary markers between the two
southbound lanes and on the innermost edge of the inside (left)
lane of travel.
There is nothing in any of the photographic
exhibits, or in other testimonial evidence, to substantiate the
wild claims of Brian Wright, brother of defendant Wayne Wright,
that at the point where the Wright van stopped to cross over to the
rolled McCorvey car, the loose gravel was 6-7" deep on the edge of
the highway shoulder and 2-3" deep in the highway lanes themselves.
9

unswept outside lane and at the innermost edge of the shoulder of
the swept inside lane.
process.

That is the nature of the chip seal

UDOT's and McCorvey's opening briefs document well that

he and Wright were both aware (and could not have been unaware) of
the presence of loose gravel in both locations. They knew this all
the time they were driving through the resurfacing project, but
particularly in the last mile before the accident where McCorvey
claimed the inside lane, which had been swept, had so much loose
gravel in it he could barely keep control of his car.
As the

jury found, Wright acted unreasonably by passing

illegally in the outside (right) lane at high speeds guaranteed to
throw up the unswept loose gravel there onto McCorvey's car.

As

the

by

jury

additionally

found, McCorvey

acted

unreasonably

accelerating and driving out of the lane of travel onto the far
edge of the shoulder of the inside (left) lane during his high
speed race to pass illegally the Wright van, instead of simply
slowing down to evade flying gravel.
In any event, as noted above under "Statement of the Case" at
pages 2-6 & n.2, evidence about the amount of gravel in either
southbound lane does not relate to any claim of negligence asserted
or assertable by McCorvey against UDOT. Thus, it is relevant only
as support for the jury's findings that:

a) McCorvey and Wright

each acted negligently under the circumstances they faced and were
both proximate causes of this accident; and b) the contractor was
negligent in carrying out the repaving operation.

10

D.

Speed Limits
According to UDOT's engineer, Richard Griffin, both before and

at trial, the contractor was allowed to open the newly chipped
outside (right) lane to traffic after rolling and before sweeping
(R. 3004 at 190-91, 201, 227), a normal and customary industry
practice (R. 3006 at 229, 236, 238, 260). The traffic control plan
permitted a regulatory speed limit of 55 mph in the unswept outside
lane because of the presence of "LOOSE GRAVEL" warning signs,
numerous regulatory "DO NOT PASS" signs, and the sight and sound of
chips thrown up by cars moving too fast for conditions (R. 3004 at
191, 197-98, 219-22; R. 2998 at 206). All of these would alert
reasonable drivers of the need to drive at speeds below the
regulatory limit as necessary in the resurfacing area to prevent
damage to windshields and paint (R. 3004 at 196, 221-24).

Most

drivers would choose to travel the swept left lane instead of the
unswept right lane (R. 3004 at 227; R. 3006 at 236).
The jury concluded that the traffic control plan approved by
UDOT negligently relied on the required warning signs and the
highway drivers' own common sense to keep speeds below 55 mph on
the newly chipped lanes if necessary to keep control of one's
vehicle or to avoid throwing gravel onto other cars. However much
it may disagree with this determination of negligence, UDOT does
not challenge the negligence finding on appeal, although it does
challenge the jury's finding on proximate causation.
E.

Missing Signs
There

is

no

evidence

to
11

support

McCorvey's

outlandish

assertion, at pages 22-23 and 49, that none of the warning signs
required by the traffic control plan were in place at the time of
his accident.6

Conflicting evidence concerning the witnesses'

varying memories of what signs were posted where is presented in
UDOT's Opening Brief at 14, 16, 18-20. McCorvey suggested at trial
that the early warners, the "ROADWORK AHEAD" signs, and some of the
twenty "DO NOT PASS" signs required by the traffic control plan
were not in the planned position in the late afternoon of August 7,
1986.

But the lane closure signage in the traffic control plan

approved by UDOT (Ex. 10) was applicable only where there was
actual chip spreading and rolling going on in a traffic lane (R.
3006 at 227-30, 234; R. 2998 at 205). No such work was going on in
the two southbound lanes of 1-15 when the accident occurred. Since
both southbound lanes of 1-15 were meant to be open, it is thus
unremarkable, when viewed in context, that LeGrand employee David
Merchant had taken down the "Right Lane Closed Ahead" signs and put
them out of sight (R. 3006 at 75). 7
6

Even if there were any evidence that no warning signs were in
place, by finding McCorvey negligent the jury necessarily
determined that McCorvey was nonetheless aware, or should have been
aware, of the obvious hazard presented by loose gravel in the
resurfacing project.
7

McCorvey misrepresents that UDOT employee Berry told Merchant
to hide these signs just before McCorvey's accident (McCorvey
Opening Brief at 26), citing to R. 3006 at 75 and 78. Merchant
said no such thing. He testified that both southbound lanes of I1-15 were open and that he had not posted any "Right Lane Closed"
or "Right Lane Closed Ahead" signs the day of the accident but had
"set them up and then leaned them over on the side of the road so
they couldn't be seen." (R. 3006 at 75). Three pages later he
states that Berry instructed him generally where to put signs (Id.
at 78), but there was no linkage to Berry directing him to take
down and hide the the lane closure signs just before McCorvey came
12

In any case, as already discussed above at pages 2-6 & n.2,
there was no claim asserted or assertable by McCorvey that UDOT
negligently failed to inspect the construction zone that afternoon
to see if every sign required by the approved traffic control plan
was still in its planned place. Thus, any evidence that some signs
were not in the positions claimed by the contractor's employee,
Steven Peterson, and any evidence that some signs had been moved by
the contractor
McCorvey's

into proper position

Opening

after the accident

(see

Brief at 25-28 & nn. 15-20) in time for

photographs by its insurance lawyer, is germane only as additional
support for the jury's finding of negligence and 50% fau.

by the

contractor in implementing the traffic control plan.8
F.

UDOT's Traffic Control Plan
It is true that the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices

(MUTCD) has been adopted in Utah, and the traffic control plan for
the project was

supposed

to adhere

to

it where applicable.

Violation of an applicable standard could be some evidence that
UDOT's traffic control plan unreasonably failed to comply with
industry standards. It is also true that LeGrand was contractually
required to construct and erect all signs on the project in
accordance with the MUTCD (R. 2998 at 114).
on the scene.
8

As even McCorvey's expert, Ruzak, recognized, traffic control
on this project was ultimately the contractor's responsibility.
The traffic control plan given to LeGrand by UDOT could have been
rejected or modified before the project began, or it could have
been unilaterally modified by LeGrand during the course of the
project as necessary to prevent damage from flying gravel (R. 3000
at 46, 47, 50, 60, 65).
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McCorvey has not demonstrated how UDOT's traffic control plan
violated an applicable standard in the MUTCD.
experts

agreed,

the MUTCD

sets

forth

As both sides'

the minimum

desirable

standards for traffic control in a work zone in selected typical
cases; it does not set legal requirements and it does not purport
to cover every situation (R. 2998 at 175, 178; Ex. 38 at sections
1A3-1A4; R. 3006 at 239-40; R. 3000 at 57). In effect, the MUTCD
leaves a decision about what signs are necessary in a particular
situation to the engineering

judgment of the traffic control

planners, but advises how they should be erected once deemed
necessary (R. 2998 at 175, 178).

The MUTCD does not say that a

traffic control plan must close down a newly chipped roadway until
after sweeping; it does not say the plan must not allow traffic to
travel at normal highway speeds until after sweeping.
At trial, McCorvey repeatedly suggested that the traffic
control plan approved by UDOT

(Ex. 10) unreasonably breached

industry standards for lane closure set out in the MUTCD.

In

particular, the MUTCD diagram relied upon by McCorvey (Ex. 39, Item
21 in McCorvey's Addendum) specifies how and where to place warning
signs and traffic control devices in order to close one of two
lanes of same-direction highway traffic while the lane to be closed
was being worked on in a stationary maintenance project. The MUTCD
contains no diagram illustrating signing for a chip resealing
project, or any other maintenance project, that is moving down the
highway instead of being stationary (see R. 3006 at 257).

Even

McCorvey admits that the MUTCD diagram was only designed to show
14

the signs and devices to be used to close a lane being worked on
(McCorvey Opening Brief at 30).
UDOT's

traffic

plan

control

plan

(Ex.

10,

Item

21 in

McCorvey's Addendum) likewise sets out the signs and devices that
were to be used in the Cove Fort Project to close a lane of traffic
using early warners, with no channelizing devices such as inverted
cones, only while resurfacing equipment was in the closed lane
spreading emulsion and chips and then rolling them (Ex. 10; R. 3004
at 191-93).
However, as the UDOT engineer on this project readily admitted
and as even McCorvey's counsel recognized in closing argument
(e.g. , R. 3008 at 54, 64), the outside unswept lane was open to
traffic beyond the interchange ramps at the time of McCorvey's
accident (R. 3004 at 190-91). All of the resurfacing equipment was
off the southbound lanes of 1-15 and was resurfacing the ramps at
milemarker 135 (R. 2998 at 192). The contractor was required by
the Standard Specifications used in Utah to open the lane to
traffic once it had been rolled (Ex. 110; R. 3000 at 67).
Thus, even if the traffic control plan approved by UDOT
violated MUTCD guidelines for how to close effectively a lane in
the work zone—because it did not use cones or barrels to channel
traffic to the unclosed lane—that deficiency would be irrelevant
here.

First,

the

lanes

in which McCorvey

and Wright were

travelling at the time of the accident were, and were meant to be,
physically open to normal traffic.

Second, the accident occurred

nearly a mile beyond the work zone at the ramps, and it was only
15

the work zone itself that the lane closure signage in both the UDOT
traffic control plan and the MUTCD diagram was meant to control (R.
2998 at 211, 183).

In the opinion of UDOT expert Leuttich, who

chaired for eleven years the committee that drafted the MUTCD
standards, UDOT's traffic control plan had nothing to do with this
accident, however insufficient it was to close the outside lane in
the work zone where the on- and off-ramps were being rechipped (R.
3006 at 227, 228, 230). Despite

MUTCD's

inapplicability

here,

however, the jury could have nonetheless found negligence in the
traffic control plan's failure to require that the unswept lane be
closed until swept, and UDOT does not challenge on appeal this
finding of negligence.
G.

The Road Race between McCorvev and Wright
As discussed above and in UDOT's Opening Brief, it was UDOT's

theory of the case that McCorvey and Wright were both negligent in
illegally passing and racing with each other at speeds that were
illegal and far in excess of what prudence required in obviously
hazardous driving conditions, i.e., a road resurfacing project
using gravel chips on the roadway. McCorvey claimed he was next to
the Wright van and was getting hit by gravel being thrown by it
from the outside lane; all the witnesses who were in the Wright van
claimed, on the other hand, that McCorvey had accelerated and
passed them by several car lengths by the time he lost control of
his vehicle. Even if the jury believed McCorvey, believed his car
was

being

hit with

gravel

thrown

by Wright's

speeding

van

immediately before he left the road, all he had to do to avoid the
16

gravel was take his foot off the gas or tap his brakes.

Instead,

McCorvey lost control of his small sports car in loose gravel on
the shoulder of the roadway precisely because he was speeding and
then accelerated even more and moved off the normal lane of travel
in an attempt to pass (Jury Instruction 32, R. 02560-61).
McCorvey wants to ignore the evidence of his own reckless and
life-threatening

behavior

in the face of obviously hazardous

driving conditions in this resurfacing area. The evidence should,
however, be viewed in a light favorable to the jury's explicit
finding

that McCorvey

and Wright were negligent

as alleged.

Defendants claimed that they were each negligent in failing to:
keep a reasonable lookout for other vehicles and road conditions,
keep their cars under control, and drive at speeds safe for the
conditions on the highway. (Jury Instruction 32, R. 02560-61).
McCorvey's

own

accident

reconstructionist

testified

he

was

travelling up to 65 mph on the roadway just before he lost control
of his car (R. 3002 at 28, 54-55, 61); Brian Wright also estimated
McCorvey's speed at 60-65 mph (R. 3007 at 143, 154).
By finding that McCorvey and Wright were negligent as claimed
by UDOT, the jury rejected the two speeding drivers' claims that
they were innocently unaware of the hazard presented by the gravel
they knew was on the road and that McCorvey was hopelessly
"trapped" by gravel being thrown by Wright's vehicle. As detailed
in UDOT's opening brief at pages 10-25, there is overwhelming
evidence to support the jury's findings of negligence by McCorvey
and by Wright, neither of which McCorvey challenges on appeal.
17

H.

Evidence Purportedly Related to the Unconstitutionality of the
Statutory Damage Cap
UDOT has not challenged or attempted to downplay the nature and

extent of McCorvey's serious injuries or pain, or his daily need as
a paralyzed quadriplegic for round-the-clock care (UDOT Opening
Brief at 4-5; McCorvey Opening Brief at 37). UDOT likewise has not
challenged or hidden the large amount of special and general
damages the jury found (id.* at 26).

UDOT accordingly considers it

inappropriate for McCorvey to recite in section HI testimony about
the extent of his pain and debilitation and the details of his
girlfriend's role in his excretory functions, under the pretense
that it is relevant to the legal issue of whether the statutory
damage cap violates the Utah Constitution.
Finally, as addressed above under section B, there is simply
no record support for McCorvey's assertion as "fact" in section H2
that

UDOT

"intentionally

shouldered

responsibility

for

this

accident" in order to shift fault onto itself and away from the
heavily insured contractor.
ARGUMENT
A.

UDOT HAS ADEQUATELY MARSHALLED ALL EVIDENCE
RELEVANT TO ITS INSUFFICIENCY CLAIMS

UDOT has adequately marshalled the evidence supporting the
jury's verdict and findings of UDOT's negligence in approving the
traffic control plan, as well as evidence of the causative link
between that negligence and the accident. UDOT is under no burden
to marshall evidence supporting other theories of negligence that
the jury was not asked to decide, which McCorvey is belatedly
18

injecting into his lawsuit to make the jury's finding on proximate
causation effectively unreviewable on appeal.
B.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, UDOT'S NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT
A PROXIMATE CAUSE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT A
SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR IN BRINGING ABOUT THE HARM.

UDOT does not contend that its actions or omissions could
never be a substantial factor in causing a highway accident.

As

noted above, McCorvey argued to the jury that UDOT was negligent
because it approved a deficient traffic control plan.

It is this

negligent conduct which must be considered when evidence concerning
the chain of proximate causation is evaluated

for its legal

sufficiency. He cannot now introduce other alternative theories of
negligence against UDOT, such as that UDOT negligently failed to
inspect the project to see that all signs required by the traffic
control plan were in place on the afternoon of August 7, 1986, or
that UDOT should have inspected the swept inside (left) lane where
McCorvey lost control of his car and removed any excess gravel from
the shoulder.
If, in accordance with McCorvey's theory of negligence, the
jury found that the traffic control plan's failure to close the
unswept right lane created an unreasonable risk of harm to drivers,
it could also have found that this omission was a cause in fact of
the accident because there would likely have been no illegal
passing using the unswept right hand lane if it had been physically
closed off to traffic.

However, causation in fact is alone

insufficient to establish proximate cause, which also embodies a
policy requirement that the negligence be a substantial factor in
19

bringing about the injury in order to be a proximate cause, or
legal cause, of it.

(UDOT Opening Brief at 28-34).

In light of

the evidence and the jury's findings that McCorvey and Wright were
negligent as claimed, by speeding and passing in loose gravel, and
that these negligent acts were proximate causes of his injury,
UDOT's negligence could not, as a matter of law, have been a
substantial causative factor in this accident.

(.Id. at 32-39).

The cases cited by McCorvey do not resolve this issue to the
contrary.

In Boccarossa v. Department of Transp., 190 Mich. App.

313, 475 N.W.2d 390 (1991), plaintiff was injured in a head-on
collision

on

the

two-lane

highway

when

the

oncoming

driver

attempted to pass. The highway department was accused of negligent
failure to designate this section of the road as a no passing zone.
The appellate court reversed a verdict for the highway department
that was based on the erroneous legal conclusion that compliance
with MUTCD standards for when a "no passing" designation was
required rendered the department not negligent as a matter or law.
Id.

The issues of the department's negligence and proximate

causation

were accordingly remanded for retrial.

In Jordan v.

Jones, 314 N.C.106, 331 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1985), the court reversed
a summary

judgment in favor of the highway department because

uncontradicted evidence showed that its allegedly negligent failure
to install a flashing light at an intersection violated the express
requirement of the applicable MUTCD standard.

Thus, there was a

genuine issue of material fact about whether the department was
negligent and whether that negligence was a proximate cause of the
20

injury.

Id.9

These cases demonstrate only that the issue of whether one
actor's negligent conduct is a proximate cause of an injury is
entirely dependent on what that conduct was and when it took place
in the chain of events, as well as on the particular nature and
sequence of other actors' conduct found to be proximate causes of
the injury.
C.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE LEGALLY UNFORESEEABLE
SUBSEQUENT NEGLIGENCE OF THE CONTRACTOR ALONE,
OR THAT OF MCCORVEY AND WRIGHT, CONSTITUTED A
SUPERSEDING, INTERVENING PROXIMATE CAUSE.

McCorvey

does

not

dispute

UDOT's

contention

that

the

subsequent negligence of LeGrand was a superseding proximate cause
of his injuries because it was unforeseeable as a matter of law.
He does, however, argue that the subsequent negligent acts of
McCorvey and Wright were foreseeable because UDOT should have known
that chip seal resurfacing agitates impatient drivers and impatient
drivers do not obey regulatory "DO NOT PASS" signs, do not stay out
of lanes with loose gravel in them, and do not pay heed to obvious
driving hazards as a restraint on their speed.

This argument is a

variation on the theme McCorvey used at trial:

It is foreseeable

that highway drivers will violate traffic laws and that they will
9

In the other case relied upon by McCorvey, Dubois v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 571 So.2d 201 (La.App. 1990), writ denied, 575 So.2d
367 (La. 1991), there was no issue raised concerning the "legal
cause" arm of proximate cause at issue in the instant case. The
negligence claim against the highway department was based on its
negligent inspection of the roadway and shoulder and resulting
failure to remove gravel. The appellate court refused to overturn
the factfinder's determination that this negligence was a cause in
fact of the accident. Id. at 204.
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drive recklessly in the face of obvious hazards, and it is
therefore UDOT's responsibility to make it physically impossible
for lawless and reckless drivers to hurt themselves or others,
UDOT has neither the responsibility nor the ability to make
imprudent or reckless driving impossible on our public highways.
One can expect that compliance with posted speed limits and "DO NOT
PASS" and other warning signs will never be 100%. But UDOT could
not reasonably have foreseen that, after travelling through ten
miles of resurfacing project in broad daylight, past the warning
signs and twenty "DO NOT PASS" signs required by its plan, McCorvey
would race his lightweight sports car against Wright's heavy truck
in a section of the freeway that had obviously been resurfaced with
loose gravel. Their intervening negligent acts, or the negligence
of the contractor in leaving loose gravel on the inside highway
shoulder,

constitute

intervening

superseding

causes

of

this

accident as a matter of law (UDOT Opening Brief at 39-46).
D.

UDOT WITHDRAWS
ITS
INSUFFICIENCY
CLAIM
REGARDING THE JURY'S APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT
BETWEEN UDOT AND MCCORVEY

In preparing this reply brief, UDOT's counsel realized that
the argument on this point was based on the premise that UDOT's
liability would be zero if its fault was less than that of
McCorvey.

However, UDOT has not contended that the "unit rule" of

determining whether a plaintiff can recover at all from multiple
defendants does not apply under the current comparative fault
statute.

See Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d
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903 (Utah 1984) (interpreting prior comparative negligence statute
as embracing "unit rule").

Under the unit rule approach, UDOT is

not liable only if the fault of all defendants is less than that of
McCorvey.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (1992).

Since the result

sought on cross-appeal by UDOT would not follow even if the Court
agreed that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the
jury's allocation of fault as between it and McCorvey, UDOT
withdraws Issue 2 and Argument II in its opening brief on this
point (UDOT Opening Brief at 2, 47-50).
E.

THE
TRIAL
COURT
COMMITTED
PLAIN
AND
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING THE "SUDDEN PERIL"
JURY INSTRUCTION

UDOT claims it was prejudicial error to give the sudden peril
emergency instruction under our system of comparative fault since
it

erroneously

inapplicable

implies

that

to the party

normal

claiming

negligence

standards

are

its protections, unfairly

emphasizes the evidence of that actor, and improperly tends to
excuse the fault of that actor (UDOT Opening Brief at 51-56).
Because this claim was not presented to the trial court as an
alternative

objection

to

the

sudden

peril

instruction,

UDOT

respectfully requests that this Court exercise its discretion and
nonetheless address the merits of the question "in the interests of
justice" pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
This exception to the normal waiver rule embodies the concept of
"plain error,"

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799

(Utah 1991), which encompasses the two related requirements of
obviousness and harmfulness, State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35
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(Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).

Both prongs of the

plain error test are satisfied in this case.
The critical issue here was whether McCorvey's loss of control
of his car in loose gravel was primarily his fault because of his
speeding and illegal passing or the defendants' fault for failing
to post more warnings or protect him from himself and Wright.

In

this circumstance, the sudden peril jury instruction assumed key
importance in telling the jury how to assess the fault to attach to
each party's conduct. Absent the confusing and incorrect statement
of current negligence law in Instruction 33 and its creation of
jury bias favoring McCorvey's tendered excuse for his actions,
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have judged
his

conduct

differently

and returned

a special verdict more

favorable to defendants by attributing more fault to McCorvey than
to them.

See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989).

Because of the substantial impact the instruction had on the jury's
assessment of relative fault in this case, Instruction 33 was
harmful. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 796-97; Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 36.
Second, in light of the Utah appellate courts' prior rulings
in Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982), Jacobsen Constr, Co.
v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980), and Donahue
v. Purfee, 780 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 789
P.2d
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(Utah

1990),

regarding

the

incorrectness

under

a

comparative negligence system of jury instructions about analogous
tort doctrines of last clear chance, assumption of the risk, and
open and obvious danger, the error in giving any sudden peril
24

instruction

should

have

been

Eldredqe, 773 P.2d at 335.

obvious

to

the

trial

court.

For these reasons, this case is

appropriate for the Court's exercise of its discretion to review
the claimed error despite UDOT's failure to specifically raise it
in the trial court.
If the merits are reached, there is no logical basis on which
to hold that the sudden emergency doctrine, created for precisely
the same reasons in the days of contributory negligence as the
other special tort doctrines already done away with by Utah courts,
nonetheless remains viable in Utah.
issue

of whether

the sudden

Although courts facing the

emergency doctrine

survived

the

adoption of a comparative negligence system have not all reached
the same conclusion, the better reasoned decisions cited in UDOT's
opening brief hold that it does not because these courts were
willing to look realistically at the impact the instruction has on
the jury's deliberative process. See also Young v. Clark, 814 P.2d
364, 369-72 (Colo. 1991) (dissenting opinion).
In

addition

to

being

inconsistent

with

a

comparative

negligence system, the sudden peril instruction is prejudicial
because of its susceptibility to misinterpretation that leads to a
jury's

application

of

different

10

principles

of

negligence

to

Even if the error was not readily apparent, the issue should
nonetheless be reviewed because of the extreme harmfulness of the
sudden peril instruction in this case. State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d
at 35 n.9. Since the jury excused McCorvey by finding him only 10%
at fault, although he was admittedly aware of the loose gravel on
the road and could easily have avoided injury by slowing down,
justice requires that this case be retried by a jury that assesses
his negligence and fault without an instruction biased in his
favor.
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different parties, id. at 370; Knapp v. Stanford, 392 So,2d 196,
198 (Miss. 1980), and to a belief that an emergency excuses the
duty of ordinary care.

Young, 814 P. 2d at

371

opinion); Simonson v. White, 220 Mont. 14, 713 P.2d
(1986).

(dissenting
983, 989

It also focuses the jury only on the requesting party's

conduct during and after the emergency, overlooking and excusing
that party's conduct beforehand:
Where there is definite evidence of negligence on the
part of the [party requesting the instruction], the
weight of such evidence might be entirely destroyed by an
instruction on sudden emergency. Such an instruction
might well cause the jury to lose sight of the negligence
which caused the emergency.
Young, 814 P.2d at 371-72 (dissenting opinion; quoting Kline v.
Emmele. 204 Kan. 629, 465 P.2d 970, 973 (1970)); see also Solt v.
Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 474, 477 (1971) (sudden peril
instruction "tends to lead the jury to a belief that the Court
thought there was a sudden emergency presented to a careful driver
free from any

negligence.").

For these reasons, the instruction

should be banned and UDOT should be granted a new trial at which no
sudden peril instruction is given.
Even if this objection to the sudden peril instruction is
rejected, UDOT did preserve at trial its claim that the evidence
did not support the instruction.

As argued in its Opening Brief

at pages 56-58, even McCorvey's version at trial of what he knew
and saw and did just prior to losing control of his car compels the
conclusion, as a matter of law, that there either was no sudden
emergency at all, or any sudden emergency faced on the roadway was
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the product of his own negligence.11
There was no sudden emergency here when Wright's van threw
gravel up onto McCorvey's Honda,

He said he had difficulty in

loose gravel in the left lane for 3/4 of a mile before the accident
(R. 3003 at 19, 70, 71, 75). If he was travelling only 55 mph from
milemarker 135 south, he had 52.3 seconds in which to take action
to avoid gravel thrown up from Wright's van by merely slowing down
and letting Wright rapidly overtake him.12 He saw the loose gravel
in the right lane (R. 3003 at 72). He had ample enough time to try
to block Wright from passing on the right (R. 3003 at 97-99), and
then to anticipate danger from flying gravel if Wright tried to
pass him there (R. 3003 at 100).
Finally,
actually

if there was an

started

"emergency"

once Wright's van

to throw gravel at his car, McCorvey's own

testimony demonstrates that he was negligent as a matter of law in
creating the emergency by refusing to slow down and drop away from
the Wright vehicle. Thus, it was error for the trial court to give

n

Thus, any emergency he faced in the median was also a result
of his own negligence.
12

Contrary to McCorvey's assertion on page 49, he did not
testify that "the events leading up to the accident all occurred in
less than two seconds." This was the period he assigned to the
time between Page flipping the bird to the Wrights and his leaving
the road (R. 3003 at 31). It is likewise simply untrue that
McCorvey and the other motorists all testified that there were no
warnings of the hazards they encountered on the roadway, as claimed
in McCorvey's Opening Brief at p. 49. UDOT's Opening Brief at
pages 10-20 details substantial evidence concerning the numerous
"DO NOT PASS" and warning signs in place at the time, the known and
obvious presence of resurfacing equipment and highway workers, and
the presence of loose gravel on the highway in both southbound
lands as admittedly perceived by McCorvey and other drivers.
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the instruction. Keller v. Shellev, 551 P.2d 513, 514 (Utah 1976);
Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, Inc. , 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347,
378 (1943).
likelihood

In the absence of that error, there is a reasonable
that the

jury would have returned

a verdict more

favorable to defendants by finding McCorvey more at fault than
defendants.

The trial court therefore abused its discretion in

denying UDOT a new trial on this basis.

UDOT requests that this

denial be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL B. McCORVEY,
Plaintiff and
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

Case No. 910054

v.
Priority No. 16
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION: and LeGRAND
JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendants and
Appellee/Cross-Appellant•
REPLY BRIEF OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AS
CROSS-APPELLANT (PART I) and RESPONSE BRIEF OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AS APPELLEE (PART II)

PART II. RESPONSE BRIEF
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from the civil judgment entered in favor of
Daniel McCorvey against UDOT for the statutory maximum of $250,000
permitted under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-34 (1989).

Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §§

78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Does

the Governmental

Immunity

Act's partial waiver of

governmental immunity, up to the dollar amount of the damage cap in
section 63-30-34, infringe upon any substantial right protected by
the state constitution's open courts provision?
2.

Did the trial court correctly determine, in light of its
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negative conclusion on Issue 1, that traditional due process and
equal protection analysis under the state constitution placed on
McCorvey

the

burden

to

overcome

the

damage

cap

statute's

presumption of constitutionality and that he had failed to make any
such showing?
3.

If the trial court erred and this Court holds that the damage

cap in section 63-30-34 violates the Utah Constitution insofar as
it

limits

recovery

from

a

governmental

entity

performing

a

governmental function, must it also strike down the balance of the
Governmental Immunity Act, including the waivers of immunity in
sections 63-30-8 and -10, as inseverable?
These issues present questions of law, on which this Court
reviews any lower court ruling for correctness. City of Monticello
v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct.
120 (1990); Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The determinative constitutional provisions and statutes are
set forth in the body of, or in the Addendum to, this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF RELEVANT FACTS
The jury's special verdict found McCorvey's damages to be
$5,421,282 and UDOT's 28% share to be $1,517,800 (R. 02521-23).
UDOT filed a motion to reduce the judgment against it to the
statutory maximum of $250,000 in the Governmental Immunity Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1989) (Addendum Item A).

In response,

McCorvey contended that the decision of this Court in Condemarin v.
University Hospital, 775 P. 2d 348
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(Utah 1989), compelled

the

conclusion that application of the statutory damage cap contravened
the Utah Constitution (Memorandum, R. 02603-05, Addendum Item B).
McCorvey characterized Condemarin, his sole legal authority, as
mandating a heightened or intermediate level of constitutional
scrutiny in any challenge to the damage cap statute under either
the due process or equal protection provisions, thereby shifting to
UDOT the burden of going forward with evidence to justify it. This
followed,

he

conclusion

reasoned,

in

from

Condemarin

this

that

Court's

every

purported

injured

majority

person

has

a

substantial right to a remedy for a personal injury and this right
is

constitutionally

regardless

protected

of whether

by

the

open

that injury resulted

courts
from

provision,
the State's

performance of a governmental function (R. 3025, 3027, 3039, 3040,
3044).
In his memorandum decision (R. 02667-68, Addendum Item C),
Judge Michael R. Murphy rejected this broad reading of the various
opinions in Condemarin, agreeing with UDOT (R. 02646-50) that no
intermediate level of constitutional scrutiny applied because there
was no right at common law to any recovery from a governmental
entity

for

governmental
highways.

injuries
function,

resulting
including

from
the

its

performance

maintenance

of

of

a

public

Since adoption of the state constitution's open courts

provision did not alter the doctrine of sovereign immunity,

no

constitutionally protected "right" was infringed by application of
the damage cap to those in McCorvey's position. Thus, traditional
due process and equal protection analysis applied, and he had not
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met

his

burden

of

constitutionality.

overcoming

the

statute's

presumptive

Judgment against UDOT was accordingly entered

for $250,000 (R. 2659-63).
On appeal, McCorvey once again relies on his interpretation of
the several opinions in Condemarin to support his generalized claim
that

the damage

cap in

section

63-30-34 violates

the

state

constitution's open courts, equal protection, and due process
guarantees in article I, sections 7, 11, and 24. (Opening Brief at
51-58).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Governmental Immunity Act embraces
sovereign

immunity

for

governmental

the

principle

entities

of

performing

governmental functions and then waives that immunity up to $250,000
in some circumstances.
statutorily

waived

To the extent the Utah Legislature has

absolute

immunity

from

suit

for

injuries

incurred in an entity's performance of a governmental function,
including the maintenance of public highways, it has not deprived
the injured person of any right protected by the open courts
provision.

Instead, it has extended a benefit by permitting a

governmental entity to be sued for conduct that would have been
immunized at common law.

Thus, application of the cap in section

63-30-34 to limit damages recoverable by a person whose right of
action is created in other sections of the Governmental Immunity
Act does not infringe any right protected by the open courts
provision, and the two-part test in Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Co. , 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985), is inapplicable to
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this case.
The various opinions in Condemarin did not hold that an
injured

person

specially

in McCorvey's

protected

right

to

position
recover

has

a

full

fundamental
damages

from

or
a

governmental entity performing a governmental function, subjecting
section 63-30-34's limit on full recovery to a heightened level of
constitutional scrutiny.

Since McCorvey erroneously relied on

Condemarin to shift onto UDOT the burden of establishing the
constitutionality of the damage cap, the trial court correctly
ruled

that he failed to carry his burden of overcoming the

presumption of constitutionality of section 63-30-34 and proving
that the Governmental Immunity Act's creation of a right of action
limited to $250/000 in damages in such circumstances violates state
due process or equal protection guarantees.
This Court has already held that governmental immunity does
not violate the equal protection guarantee in article I, § 24 of
the Utah Constitution.

Since the legislature can constitutionally

retain absolute sovereign immunity, it can constitutionally waive
that immunity only up to a fixed dollar amount. Thus, the right of
action up to $250,000 the Act gives to victims of governmental
tortfeasors does not create an unreasonable classification treating
them differently from victims of nongovernmental tortfeasors. The
doctrine of sovereign immunity itself does that.
Section 63-30-34 treats all beneficiaries of the Governmental
Immunity Act the same by capping at the same dollar amount all
judgments against governmental entities for personal injuries
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resulting from the discharge of a governmental function. It is not
inherently unreasonable for the legislature, once it has chosen to
waive absolute sovereign immunity/ to opt for limited liability
instead of unlimited liability, particularly in light of:

the

magnitude and nature of governmental functions; the potential for
liability in performing such functions; the need for some certainty
in projecting future liability costs as part of a comprehensive
risk management
governmental

program;

functions

and

and

the need

judgments

to pay
from

for essential

public

treasuries

generated by reasonable tax burdens.
The Governmental Immunity Act serves the legitimate purposes
of compensating many victims of governmental tortfeasors who would
otherwise have no recovery, while preserving the public treasury
from unpredictable large judgments that would curtail government's
ability to function.

A damage cap, set at a fixed

amount

appropriately through the legislative process, is a reasonable
means for achieving those purposes. Section 63-30-34 specifically
provides

a

nonarbitrary

maximum

recovery

figure

with

which

governmental entities can rationally plan for and tax for their
future liability and for other necessary government expenditures.
It violates neither the due process nor the uniform operation of
the laws provisions of the Utah Constitution.
The damage cap likewise does not violate an article I, section
10 right to jury trial of victims of governmental tortfeasors who
had no right of action at all at common law, an issue that McCorvey
did not preserve in the trial court.
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A jury still determines the

facts and assesses damages, which are the protections afforded by
article I, section 10.
Finally, if application of the damage cap in section 63-30-34
to limit the liability of a governmental entity performing a
governmental function is held to violate any provision of the Utah
Constitution, this Court must also invalidate, as inseparable, the
balance of the Governmental Immunity Act.
history makes

As the legislative

clear, the legislature would

not have adopted

unlimited liability and waived absolute immunity for governmental
functions in the Act without the damage cap on liability. Without
the Governmental Immunity Act, McCorvey has no right to a remedy
from UDOT at all and the judgment against UDOT must, therefore, be
vacated.
ARGUMENTS
Introduction
McCorvey's state constitutional challenges to the damage cap
in the Governmental Immunity Act must be considered in light of the
history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the principle that
the state cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.
Sovereign immunity was a well-settled feature of American common
law when Utah became a state and adopted its constitution. Madsen
v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983); Galleoos v. Midvale
Citv, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (1972); Wilkinson v.
State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626, 630 (1913).

Although not without

its critics, e.g., Niblock v. Salt Lake Citv, 100 Utah 573, 111
P.2d

800, 804

(1941) (concurring opinion of Wolfe, J.), the
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doctrine has nonetheless been applied continually by the courts of
this state to immunize governmental entities from tort liability
when carrying out a governmental function, absent any waiver of
immunity.

E.g. , Ramirez v. Oaden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P. 2d

463, 464 (1955), and cases cited therein; see also Condemarin, 775
P.2d at 349

(separate opinion of Durham, J.); id. at 370-71

(separate opinion of Stewart, J.); l£L»

at

383 (dissenting opinion

of Hall, C.J.).
In 1963, the Utah Legislature directed the Utah Legislative
Council to study the effects of the waiver of governmental immunity
enjoyed at common law upon the state, its political subdivisions,
and municipal corporations.

House Joint Resolution 21 (March 14,

1963) (Addendum Item D). A twenty-one member Governmental Immunity
Committee

of

legislators,

laypersons,

and

representatives

of

governmental units was formed by the Council at the legislature's
direction and met monthly for two years.

36th Utah Legislature,

Record of House Proceedings, February 11, 1965.

The committee

gathered data about liability insurance costs and availability, and
prepared numerous working drafts of legislation.

Report and

Recommendations of the Utah Legislative Council 1963-65 at 45-46
(Addendum Item E).
In its final report, the Council recommended legislation that
reaffirmed the doctrine of governmental immunity, but waived that
immunity in certain exceptional circumstances where deemed required
"as a matter of justice."

.Id. at 48. The Council concluded that

injury resulting from the negligence of governmental employees
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performing

governmental

functions

was

such

an

exceptional

circumstance, but it recognized that open-ended liability would
endanger governmental operating budgets and substantially interfere
with the governmental entities' ability to fulfill the functions
required of government:
Numerous citizens have been injured in their person
and property by negligent acts of government employees
and by the construction of public improvements. In many
of these cases no recourse against the governmental
entity has been possible. It was found that the present
system works substantial injustice to citizens. There is
a fear, however, among government officials, that to open
the door to unrestrained claims would be too burdensome
upon governmental funds.
Id. at 46.
Council,

Proposed legislation along the lines suggested by the

Senate

Bill

4, the

Governmental

Immunity

Act, was

ultimately recommended for passage by the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary in January 1965.

1965 Senate Journal at 101.

The

Committee reasoned that the doctrine of sovereign immunity needed
to be modified in our modern society to do equity to injured
citizens, but pointed out that the recommended bill empowered
governmental entities to protect themselves by purchasing liability
insurance.

Id.

At the bill's reading, copies of the Legislative Council's
report were distributed.

Bill sponsor Senator Charles Welch, Jr.,

recited numerous examples of personal injuries suffered at the
hands of governmental employees negligently performing their duties
where no compensation from the employer entity was possible because
of the common law governmental immunity doctrine.

He repeatedly

stressed to his colleagues that the injuries incurred worked the
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same hardship whether the negligent tortfeasor was a government
employee or a private citizen.

However, he also repeatedly

recounted to them the experiences of California, Nevada, and
Arizona in which many millions of dollars in claims were filed
against governmental entities in the period after their state
appellate courts had abolished governmental immunity as a common
law doctrine, but before state lawmakers had had a chance to adopt
controlling legislation.

Endorsing his bill's "middle of the road

course" between absolute immunity and unlimited liability, Welch
encouraged his colleagues to address the issue legislatively,
before the Utah courts did, and to "open the doors" to suits
involving injury "[b]ut not to open that door wide open where it
would be detrimental to the State or its subdivisions."

36th Utah

Legislature, Record of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1965; 36th
Utah Legislature, Record of House Proceedings, February 11, 1965.
Injured persons would thus be protected by the waivers of immunity,
while governmental entities and the public would be protected by
the statutory limitation on the amount of liability.

36th Utah

Legislature, Record of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1965.
The record of legislative debate of Senate Bill 4 reveals that
many legislators were skeptical about Welch's claim that this was
only a partial opening of the litigation door. Some were concerned
about the "real costs" of the bill, particularly the increased
costs to entities for liability insurance coverage or for defending
the rash of suits likely to ensue because of the waivers of
immunity.

Id., disc IV. Others were concerned that entities with
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restricted mill levies or tax bases could not raise enough money to
pay for insurance premiums or for large judgments.

36th Utah

Legislature, Record

11, 1965.

of House Proceedings, February

Senator Welch attempted to allay these fears by pointing out the
bill's dollar limit cap on any judgment obtained where immunity had
been waived.

Id.

Representative Bullock believed that some

control would be provided by the presence on the jury of taxpayers,
who would ultimately have to foot the bill.

JEd.

Representative

Buckner expressed his reluctant support of the bill, warning his
colleagues,
I would hate to see the door open too wide. But on the
opposite side of the coin, I think we have very little
choice facing us based upon the history of surrounding
states and what has happened when a court test has gone
to the supreme court and they have thrown out completely
the governmental immunity. I think the people of this
State are entitled to some defense and unless we get
something like this on the books that's been studied for
many years, I think we have some real problems facing us.
Id.

Several legislators remarked that many of their constituents,

particularly those from sparsely populated counties and small
municipalities, strongly opposed the bill and had urged them to
vote against it. One legislator opposed the bill as "an automatic
increase in property tax" by each taxing entity, while another
suggested that they enact only that portion of the bill adopting
absolute governmental immunity and not enact any waiver provisions.
id.
Senate Bill 4 was, in fact, defeated in the House vote that
took place after these discussions, with 31 votes in favor of
passage and 36 against.

Id.; 1965 House Journal at 341.
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On

reconsideration, Representative Harding, House sponsor of Senate
Bill 4, told his colleagues the bill was defeated only because of
a misunderstanding that it would bankrupt government entities with
million dollar judgments. He referred them again to section 34 of
the bill, which required a court to reduce any judgment to the
dollar amount of the liability limit set by section 29, telling
them there was no opportunity for a judgment in excess of that
damage cap amount.

Id.

Noting that the bill was drafted by a committee with eight
lawyers on it and recounting how a New Jersey School District had
been

bankrupted

by

one

large

personal

injury

judgment,

Representative Prior rose in opposition to the bill, saying that
supporters' representations about how minimal the increased costs
would be "do not jibe with real experience."

After pointing out

that tort claims against the state of California had jumped from
$4.71 million to $9.75 million in the year following judicial
abolition of common law governmental immunity, Prior added, "Now,
these are the things that our communities are fearful of that will
bankrupt the subdivisions of our state[.]"

Id.

Despite these concerns, the House nonetheless passed the bill
by a 41-25 vote.

1965 House Journal at 343.

Immunity Act, went into effect July 1, 1966.
139 (Addendum Item F).

The Governmental

1965 Utah Laws, ch.

In Section 3, the legislature adopted

immunity from suit of all governmental entities "for any injury
that may result from the activities of said entities wherein said
entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental
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function," except as otherwise provided for in the Act,

Immunity

was waived for defective, unsafe, or dangerous conditions on roads,
highways and sidewalks, as well as for nonlatent defects in public
structures and public improvements. 1965 Utah Laws, ch. 139, §§ 8,
9.

Immunity from suit was also waived for injuries proximately

caused by the negligence of government employees acting within the
scope of their employment, with numerous exceptions to waiver.
Id., § 10. Senator Welch had repeatedly told his colleagues these
exceptions in section 10 were specifically intended to protect the
entities by retaining immunity in some circumstances.

36th Utah

Legislature, Record of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1965, disc
II. Political subdivisions of the State were authorized in Section
27 to impose taxes to pay judgments, or to settle or defend claims.
Section 28 authorized entities to purchase liability insurance.
Section 34 required a court to reduce to the amounts listed in
Section 29 ($100,000 per injured person and $300,000 per accident)
or to the amount of any insurance coverage in excess of those
figures, any judgment obtained in an action for which immunity had
been waived by the Act.
Section 29 was repealed by 1983 Utah Laws ch. 130, § 5, but
its liability limitations were incorporated into reenacted section
34, which was rewritten essentially into the form it took at the
time of McCorvey's judgment, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1989)
(Addendum Item A).

In the reenactment process, the personal injury

damage caps were raised to $250,000 per person and $500,000 per
accident by Substitute House Bill 289. 1983 Utah Laws, ch. 130, §
41

3,

House Bill 289's increase in the liability limit from that in

effect since 1965 was described as intended to "reflect more fairly
current recovery levels."

1983 General Session, Governmental

Immunity Act Amendments, Explanation Material, para. 2 [on file in
the bill file at Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel].
According

to

the

bill's

sponsor,

Representative

Gayle

McKeachnie, this and other 1983 amendments to the Governmental
Immunity Act were negotiated as a package deal by the League of
Cities and Towns, the Association of Counties, representatives from
the Attorney General's Office and higher education, and plaintiffs'
attorneys.

44th Utah Legislature, Record of House Proceedings,

February 24, 1983, disc I.
Six years later, in Condemarin, 775 P. 2d at 366, Justices
Durham, Zimmerman, and Stewart reached the limited holding that the
$100,000 damage cap imposed by sections 63-30-29 and -34 before
1983 is "unconstitutional" only as applied to limit recovery from
University Hospital in a medical malpractice action.

Although a

majority could not agree on which constitutional provision was
violated by the damage cap in that case, as discussed below the
starting point

for the three concurring

justices' heightened

scrutiny under both the equal protection and due process provisions
was the open courts guarantee in article I, § 11.
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A.

BECAUSE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES ENJOYED COMPLETE
COMMON LAW SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR INJURIES
ARISING FROM THEIR PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTIONS WHEN THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION WAS
ADOPTED, THERE WAS AND IS NO SUBSTANTIAL
"RIGHT" TO RECOVER, PARTIALLY OR FULLY, FROM
THOSE ENTITIES FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM
DISCHARGE
OF
A
GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTION,
INCLUDING THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS.
THUS, THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT'S PARTIAL
WAIVER OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY, UP TO THE AMOUNT
OF THE DAMAGE CAP IN SECTION 63-30-34 (1989),
DOES NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHT PROTECTED BY THE
OPEN COURTS PROVISION IN ARTICLE I, § 11.

Utah's open courts provision, Utah Const, article I, § 11,
states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party.
In Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Co., 717 P.2d 670, 680
(Utah 1985), this Court established a two-part test to determine
whether a statute can limit or eliminate a common law right of
action or remedy consistent with due process and the open courts
provision.

Although the open courts provision protects a person

from being "arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to
protect basic individual rights," id. at 675, it does not create
new remedies or new rights of action that did not exist at common
law.

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d at 629; Brown v. Wicrhtman, 47

Utah 31, 151 P. 366, 366-67 (1915).
As noted above, an injured person had no common law right of
action against, or remedy from, a governmental entity performing a
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governmental function. See also Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah
589, 228 P. 213 (1924) (right to sue city for injuries caused by
negligent repair of city street did not exist at common law and
thus is only statutory).

Since the adoption of the open courts

provision worked no change in the principle of sovereign immunity,
this Court has held, legislatively adopted sovereign
itself does not violate the open courts provision.

immunity
Madsen v.

Borthick, 658 P. 2d at 629 (adopting the reasoning in Brown v.
Wichita State Univ., 219 Kan. 2, 547 P.2d 1015, 1022-24 (1976));
accord Neal v. Donahue, 611 P.2d

1125, 1128-29

(Okl. 1980);

Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Washburn County, 2 Wis.2d 214, 85 N.W.2d 840
(1957)

(no

remedy

protected

by

open

courts

provision

since

government immune at common law for negligence occurring in the
performance of a governmental function, such as maintenance of
highways); see also Wright v. Colleton County School Distr., 301
S.C. 282, 391 S.E.2d 564, 570 (1990) (open courts provision is not
a guarantee of full compensation to all injured). As the courts in
Madsen

v.

Borthick

and

Brown

v.

Wichita

State

University

understood, a broad reading of the open courts provision as
protecting rights or remedies that did not even exist when the
constitution was adopted would prohibit retention of governmental
immunity even for governmental functions. Brown, 547 P.2d at 1024.
Under Madsen, a person injured in the course of a governmental
entity's performance of a governmental function simply has no
"right" that is constitutionally protected by the open courts
provision from legislative infringement.
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Without arguing that Madsen has been overruled, McCorvey
maintains

that

after

Condemarin

it makes

no

difference, in

analyzing his state constitutional challenges to the damage cap
statute, whether a person's injury is incurred in a governmental
entity's discharge of a nongovernmental function or a governmental
function, as defined in Standiford v. Salt Lake Citv Corp,, 605
P.2d 1230 (1980) and its progeny.13

(R. 3025, 3027, 3039, 3040,

3044).

on this point, Condemarin

If McCorvey were correct

effectively declared governmental immunity itself unconstitutional
under the open courts provision.
However, a majority of this Court in Condemarin never ruled
that the damage cap statute was unconstitutional as applied to
governmental functions for which the entity would have been immune
at common law.

As Justice Durham stated in the lead opinion,

"there is no fundamental right to recover unlimited damages from
governmental

entities

performing

governmental

functions."

Condemarin, 755 P.2d at 342 (opinion of Durham, J.).
Condemarin involved application of the damage cap to limit
liability of the University Hospital for medical malpractice.
Precisely because the operation of this hospital was not considered
a governmental

function, a majority concluded

the Condemarin

plaintiff had a common law right to recover from the governmental
entity

for negligently

inflicted

13

injuries, a right

that was

Because McCorvey's cause of action arose prior to the 1987
enactment of the statutory definition of "governmental function" in
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (1989), UDOT's references here to the
term are to "governmental function" as defined by the case law.
See Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev. Corp.. 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990).
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infringed by the damage cap.
(opinion of Durham, J.,

Condemarin, 755 P.2d at 357-58)
a

joined by Zimmerman, J.); ±d*

t 372

(opinion of Stewart, J.). And because the damage cap limited the
right to unlimited recovery that existed at common law, Condemarin,
775 P.2d at 356 (opinion of Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman, J.)/
Justices

Durham

constitutional

and

scrutiny

Zimmerman

determined

applied:

"The

that

heightened

opinion

[in

Berry1

identified a special class of constitutional rights which are
afforded protection under article I, section 11.

Legislative

attempts to abrogate those rights should be closely examined by
this Court. . . . " JTd. at 358.

"[B]ecause of the constitutional

status of the right to a remedy for damage to one's person under
article

I, section

11, more

[than a rational basis

infringing legislation] is required."

Ld.

for the

Accord id. at 368

(concurring opinion of Zimmerman, J.) (because the interests at
stake were specifically protected by the open courts provision,
presumption of constitutionality shifted and the burden was on the
state to justify any infringement).
Justice Stewart agreed: "The right involved here is the right
to a full remedy for a personal injury, a right protected by
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution . . . .

The term

'remedy,' as used in the open courts clause, means the full, fair,
and complete remedy provided by the common law."
(separate opinion of Stewart, J.)

Id. at 372

(emphasis added).

Justice

Stewart explained that a statute infringing a right protected by
the open courts provision must be reviewed under a more stringent
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standard

of

constitutionality

than

that

applicable

to

"a

nonconstitutional interest, such as a general social or economic
interest."

Jlci. at 370.

Justice Stewart then stated the issue in

Condemarin as whether the legislature had violated article I,
section 24 "by limiting the liability of an institution owned by
government which performs nongovernmental
(italics in original).
University

Hospital

is

activities."

Id., at 372

Agreeing that the state's operation of
not

a

governmental

function

in

the

constitutional sense, Justice Stewart succinctly described the line
that governmental immunity demarcates between the constitutionally
protected

right

of the Condemarin

plaintiff,

injured

in the

discharge of a nongovernmental function, and the nonconstitutional
interest of McCorvey and others injured in a governmental entity's
discharge of a governmental function:
[T]he fStandiford test for governmental function]
articulates the core value protected by governmental
immunity—providing protection to the public treasury and
tax revenues against overwhelming losses so that the
essential functions of government will not be impaired.
The test also identifies where the constitutional right
of a person to have a remedy for personal injury begins
under Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution as
against a governmental agency, and where the governmental
right to immunity from such lawsuits stops.
Id. at 371-72.

Chief Justice Hall and Justice Howe, in dissent,

likewise clearly viewed the damage cap statute as nonviolative of
the open courts provision when applied to government entities
engaged in governmental functions. J[d. at 383 (dissenting opinion
of Hall, C.J.).
The continuing vitality of governmental immunity and the error
in McCorvey's analysis of the various views expressed in Condemarin
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are further evidenced by this Court's repeated application of the
Governmental

Immunity

Act,

after

Condemarin,

to

immunize

governmental entities performing governmental functions as defined
by the Standiford test, unless that immunity has been waived by the
legislature and the procedural requirements of the Act have been
satisfied.

E.g. , Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R,f 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 19

(Utah 1992) (UDOT's immunity for decision re upgrading traffic
control device not waived by Act); Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev.
Corp., 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990) (inspection and acceptance of
subdivision

improvements

is

governmental

immunity has not been waived by Act);
Salt

Lake

City

Corp.,

784

P.2d

function

for

which

Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores v.
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(Utah

1989)

(city's

construction, operation and maintenance of flood control system is
a governmental function).
As noted

above, McCorvey

has

assumed

that

it makes no

difference if a governmental entity is engaged in a governmental
function.

In the trial court, he expressly assumed that UDOT was

performing a governmental function and stated the issue presented:
"We are then balancing the constitutional right of access to the
courts, open access to the courts, versus the state's right to
protect the treasury, which is a nonconstitutional right."
3039).

(R.

McCorvey never disputed that, in maintaining the 43,244

miles of public highway system in Utah,1* UDOT or the other
u

UD0T Office of Policy and Systems Planning, Annual
Statistical Summary, at 1 (Nov. 1991). The 5,793 miles of public
highways (including interstates) maintained by UDOT constitutes
only 13% of the total highway mileage, but accomodates 71% of the
14.6 billion vehicle miles of travel each year. Id.
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responsible

governmental

entity

is performing

a

governmental

function under the Standiford test,15 UDOT's duties in this regard
are set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 27-12-7, -21, -86, -88(1). -95,
96, and -104 (Supp. 1991), and 63-49-4 and -8(1)(a) (Supp. 1991).
See also Utah Const, art. XIII, § 13 (revenues from highway user
and motor fuel taxes are to be used exclusively for highway
purposes, including construction and maintenance of city streets,
county roads, and state highways).
As Judge Murphy noted, this Court has recognized that a
governmental

entity's

construction

and maintenance

roadways is such a governmental function.

of

public

In Richards v. Leavitt,

716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985), plaintiff sued for injuries suffered
allegedly as the result of the city's negligent failure to maintain
a

traffic

highways.

control

device

at the intersection

of

two public

In holding that the maintenance and repair of traffic

signs is a governmental function under Standiford, this Court

^Construction and maintenance of public roads by a
governmental entity was consistently held to be an immunized
governmental function under the test used by this Court before
Standiford. e.g., Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah
1977); Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800, 802
(1941); Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924);
see also Gallegos v. Midvale City, 492 P.2d at 1335-36
(municipality would have been immune at common law for injuries
suffered because of the defective or unsafe condition of a city
steet); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975) (implicitly
holds that State's planning and construction of highway is a
governmental function, and expressly holds that immunity for that
function was not retained by the discretionary function exception
in section 63-30-10(1)); Carroll v. State Road Comm'n, 27 Utah 2d
384, 496 P»2d 888 (1972) (implicitly holds that erection of traffic
warning signs on state highway is a governmental function, and
expressly holds that immunity not retained for the specific
negligent act by section 63-30-10(1)).
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pointed out that the categorization of maintenance of all public
ways as a governmental function is inherent in the waiver of
immunity

in

section

63-30-8

for

injury

caused

by

defective

highways, streets and other public ways. jrd.. at 278; see Ingram v.
Salt

Lake

City,

733

P.2d

126,

127

(Utah

1987)

(city

has

nondelegable duty to maintain city streets in reasonably safe
condition); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1987)
(same).
Since there was no common law right of action to recover any
compensation

for

personal

injury

from

a

governmental

entity

performing a governmental function, the damage cap in section 6330-34 does not infringe or take away any right of persons so
injured that is protected by the open courts provision.
Other states' statutory damage caps have withstood challenges
under similar state constitutional provisions.

In Cauley v. City

of Jacksonville, 403 So.2d 379, 384-85 (Fla. 1981), plaintiffs sued
for

injuries

suffered

as

a

maintenance of a city roadway.

result

of

the

city's

negligent

The Florida Supreme Court upheld a

$50,000 per person/$100,000 per occurrence limit on

judgments

against governmental entities for which the same statute waived
immunity.

Because there was no common law right to recover from

the municipality in such a case, there could be no right to redress
that was protected by the open courts provision.

Accord Hale v.

Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 783 P.2d 506, 511-12 (1989); Texas
Dept. of Mental Health v. Petty, 817 S.W.2d 707, 721 (Tex. App.
1991), application

for writ of error granted March 4, 1992;
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Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis.2d 823, 280 N.2d 711, 720 (1979).
More recently, in State v. DeFoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992)
(en banc), petition for cert, filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3829 (June 6,
1992), the Colorado Supreme Court rejected an open courts challenge
to the Colorado governmental immunity act's limited waiver of
governmental immunity, up to the $150,000 per person/$400,000 per
occurrence statutory cap.

In a suit against the state highway

department for negligent clearing of debris from a state road, the
DeFoor court concluded that the state constitution's open courts
provision only protected access to the courts for extant: rights of
action to redress personal injury.

Ld. at 790-91.

In sum, McCorvey's only "right" to recover from UDOT for his
injuries is that statutorily created action for limited damages
authorized in the Governmental Immunity Act's partial waiver of
immunity only up to the extent of the damage cap. See Leliefeld v.
Johnson,

659

P.2d

111,

128-29

(Idaho

1983).

Absent

the

infringement or deprivation of a right of action or remedy that is
constitutionally protected by the open courts provision, it is
inappropriate to apply the two-part Berry test to the challenged
statute in this case.

See Caulev, 403 So.2d at 385; DeFoor, 824

P.2d at 791.
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B.

SECTION 63-30-34, WHICH IMPINGES NO SPECIALLY
PROTECTED RIGHT BY LIMITING JUDGMENTS AGAINST
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES WHERE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
HAS BEEN STATUTORILY WAIVED, IS PRESUMPTIVELY
CONSTITUTIONAL. McCORVEY HAS FAILED TO CARRY
HIS BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE $250,000 DAMAGE
CAP IN SECTION 63-30-34 DENIES PERSONS INJURED
IN THE COURSE OF A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY'S
PERFORMANCE OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION RIGHTS
PROTECTED BY ARTICLE I, §§ 7 AND 24.

Legislative enactments are generally afforded

a strong

presumption of constitutionality, Mt. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Garfield County. 811 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1991); City of Monticello
v. Christensen, 788 P.2d at 516; State ex rel. Div. Consumer
Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990).
The heavy burden of overcoming that presumption and proving a
statute's invalidity is on the party challenging it. Greenwood v.
City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). Mt. States
Tel. & Tel. Co.. 811 P.2d at 187; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah
v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989); see also Rio Vista Oil.
Ltd..

786

P.2d

at

1349-50.

Presumptive

constitutionality

dissipates and the burden thereby shifts, requiring the opposing
party to prove the constitutional validity of the challenged
statute, only where it impinges on a fundamental or specially
protected

interest.

See City of West Jordan v. Utah State

Retirement Bd• . 767 P.2d 530, 537 (Utah 1988) (article I, § 24
analysis); Rio Vista Oil Ltd.. 786 P.2d at 1350 (dictum re due
process analysis); see also Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 368 (Zimmerman,
J., concurring) (once infringement of interest protected by open
courts provision is shown, burden of proving statute does not
violate due process in article I, § 7 is on proponent of its
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validity); id. at 363 (opinion of Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman,
J.) (due process analysis; state failed to make necessary showing
of need for, and reasonableness of, damage cap).
Unlike the Condemarin plaintiff, however, persons injured by
a governmental entity performing a governmental function have no
right to full recovery for personal injuries that is specially
protected by the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.
At most, an individual in this latter group has a statutorily
created interest in recovering from the governmental entity only up
to the amount of the damage cap. As Judge Murphy correctly ruled
(Memorandum Decision, R. 02668), because this interest is neither
a fundamental right nor a substantial one specifically protected by
the

constitution,

the

damage

cap

statute

was

presumed

constitutional and the burden remained on McCorvey to prove its
invalidity.
McCorvey made no effort to carry his burden in the trial
court.
argument
seriously

Instead, he merely asserted in his six-sentence legal
that

the

injured

damage
victims

cap
of

is

"unconstitutional"

governmental

tortfeasors

because
cannot

recover all their actual damages, while other, less seriously
injured victims

of a governmental tortfeasor

Responsive Memorandum, R. 02605).

can

(Plaintiffs

McCorvey relied solely on his

erroneous reading of Condemarin as shifting the burden of proof
onto the State to satisfy the two-part Berry test (not applicable
in this case) by demonstrating the damage cap's reasonableness
under due process or equal protection analysis (id.; R. 3026-3031,
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3040, 3043).
Section 63-30-34 provides a reasonable method for protecting
taxpayers and governmental entities' operating budgets and assets
from unpredictable catastrophic losses caused in the performance of
governmental functions and a figure on which future losses can be
actuarially estimated and planned for.
limit

on

a

governmental

entity's

It establishes a rational
liability

that

has

been

appropriately reached through competing interests' give and take in
the

democratic

political

process.

It

is

the

result

of a

legislative balancing of the desire to compensate with a realistic
view of the taxing capacities of governmental units and the scope
of potential governmental liability, in light of past actuarial
experience and projected losses.
In light of McCorvey's failure to go forward in the trial
court with any evidence or relevant argument and analysis to
support a contrary conclusion, i.e., that section 63-30-34 is
unconstitutional under the applicable mode of analysis, this Court
should affirm the trial court's conclusion that McCorvey failed to
overcome the presumptive constitutionality of section 63-30-34.16
On appeal, McCorvey should not be allowed to shift the burden

16

In the event this Court determines Judge Murphy erred in
placing the burden of proof on McCorvey, and that the burden should
be on UDOT to prove the statute's constitutionality, the
appropriate remedy for his error is to remand this case for further
proceedings on the issue of the statute's constitutionality. UDOT
would then have an opportunity to go forward with its proof, such
as the premium-setting and risk forecasting methods used by the
actuaries at Risk Management, self-insurance and insurance costs
and availability, catastrophic insurance unavailablity, and the
claims history of state and local governmental entities.
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of proving the damage cap statute's constitutionality to UDOT. See
City of West Jordan, 767 P.2d at 537. Nonetheless, if this Court
goes on to examine the merits of the constitutional claims that
McCorvey merely asserts without applicable analysis, it will find
that section 63-30-34 does not violate the due process or equal
protection rights of persons injured during the discharge of a
governmental function.
C.

THE CLASSIFICATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL TORT
VICTIMS CREATED BY THE DAMAGE CAP IN THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DO NOT VIOLATE THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION'S UNIFORM OPERATION OF THE
LAWS
PROVISION.
A FIXED CEILING ON
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES' LIABILITY, WHICH WILL
NECESSARILY PRECLUDE FULL RECOVERY OF DAMAGES
BY SOME PLAINTIFFS, IS REASONABLE IN LIGHT OF
THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSES SERVED BY
THE
ACT'S
PARTIAL
WAIVER
OF
ABSOLUTE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY.
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides

that "[a]11 laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
This provision has been interpreted as reflecting the "settled
concern of the law that the legislature be restrained from the
fundamentally unfair practice" of classifying persons in such a
manner that those who are similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the challenged law are treated differently by it, to the
detriment of the complaining class. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v.
State, 779 P.2d at 637 (quoting Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at
888).

In examining a challenged statute for compliance with

article

I section

24, this court determines

(1) whether the

classification is reasonable; (2) whether the objectives of the
legislative action are legitimate; and (3) whether there is a
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reasonable relationship between the legislative classification and
the legislative purposes•

Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 637 P.2d at

637; see Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670-75 (Utah 1984).
In applying this mode of equal protection analysis, general
social or economic legislative enactments are given varying degrees
of scrutiny depending on the nature of the complainant's affected
interest. If the challenged statute impinges no fundamental right,
or one that is specially protected by another state constitutional
provision such as the open courts provision, the legislature must
be given broad deference when this Court scrutinizes both the
reasonableness

of

the

legislative

classifications

relationship to legitimate legislative purposes.
Blue Shield,

and

their

Blue Cross and

779 P.2d at 637. As this Court has stated,

When considering challenges to matters of economic
regulation that do not affect specially protected
interests, we give deference to the legislature's
judgment as to classifications needed to achieve the ends
sought. To strike down such legislation, we must find
that the means are not reasonably related to the
achievement of a legitimate legislative purpose.
City of West Jordan, 767 P.2d at 537 (citations omitted); see also
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
83-84

(1978)

(statutory

cap

on

liability

for

nuclear

plant

accidents is a classic example of economic regulation to which
rational

basis

test

applies).

Because

those

injured

by

governmental tortfeasors performing governmental functions have no
constitutional or specially protected right to recover fully, or at
all, from governmental entities, this deferential level of scrutiny
is applicable to McCorvey's challenge to section 63-30-34.
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The

statute must accordingly be upheld under the uniform operation of
the laws provision unless it is not reasonably related to the
achievement of any conceivable, permissible legislative objective.
See Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 779 P.2d at 637; Baker v. Matheson,
607 P.2d 233, 244 (1979) (sustain legislative classifications if
facts

can

reasonably

be

conceived

to

justify

the

disparate

treatment); see also Rio Vista Oil, 786 P.2d at 1350.
With regard to the first step of the test for article I
section 24 compliance, McCorvey asserts on appeal, that section 6330-34 creates three unreasonable and therefore constitutionally
impermissible classifications: (a) between victims of governmental
tortfeasors and nongovernmental tortfeasors; (b) between victims of
governmental negligence and victims of governmental takings; and
(c) between plaintiffs granted the ability to sue the sovereign
whose damages are less than the $250,000 cap, and those similarly
situated whose damages exceed the cap. Only classification (c) was
argued to the trial court.
The first classification is created, not by the damage cap
statute, but by the principle of sovereign immunity itself as
embraced

by the Governmental

Immunity Act and then partially

waived.

See Hale, 783 P.2d at 516; Brown, 547 P.2d at 1029.

McCorvey has neither claimed nor proven that governmental immunity
for governmental functions violates any constitutional provision.
Indeed, this Court has already held that the Governmental Immunity
Act does not violate article I, section 24 by failing to completely
waive absolute immunity for injuries arising from the performance
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of all governmental functions,

Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93

(Utah 1978); see also Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 363 (opinion of
Durham, J.) (rejecting "extreme position" that naked existence of
governmental immunity violates equal protection).
The Colorado Supreme Court also rejected a head-on state equal
protection challenge to governmental immunity that was aimed at the
statutory damage cap for injuries arising out of governmental
functions.

Concluding there was no statutory infringement on a

fundamental right, the court held that the statutory classification
granting

only

limited

recovery

to

victims

of

governmental

tortfeasors had a reasonable basis in fact and was reasonably
related to the legitimate governmental objective of providing
fiscal certainty in carrying out the manifold responsibilities of
government.

Lee v. Colorado Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 226-27

(Colo. 1986).
The statutory classification limiting the amounts
recoverable against a public entity is based on real
differences in fact between governmental and private
tortfeasors.
Public entities are responsible for
providing a vast array of governmental services to the
public and, as a result, are exposed to far greater
liability and risks than a private individual. Moreover,
the public entity, unlike the private individual, does
not have the option of declaring bankruptcy or going out
of business when subjected to tort liability, but rather
must continue to carry out its responsibility to the
public. The legislative decision to limit the public
entity's liability . . . therefore, proceeds from actual
differences in the magnitude and character of the
functions assumed by public entities and in the effect of
greater potential liability exposure on the public
entity's ability to continue its governmental functions.
Id. at 227.

Lee was recently reaffirmed in State v. DeFoor, 824

P.2d 783, 787 (Colo. 1992), which held that the legislature could,
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consistent with the state and federal equal protection guarantees,
statutorily waive governmental immunity for the maintenance of
public highways while simultaneously limiting that recovery to a
fixed dollar amount.

The DeFoor court concluded that the damage

cap was rationally related to the legitimate state interests of
fiscal

solvency

and

provision

of

essential

services

while

minimizing taxpayer burden that would result from unforeseeable and
unlimited tort judgments. Id. at 790; see Condemarin, 775 P.2d at
372 (opinion of Stewart, J.) (value protected by governmental
immunity is to provide "protection to the public treasury and tax
revenues

against

overwhelming

losses

so

that

the

essential

functions of government will not be imperiled").
In short, as long as absolute governmental immunity can be
legislatively retained without violating article I, section 24,
Madsen

v.

State,

P. 2d

583

at

94,

the

first

challenged

classification created by the Governmental Immunity Act's adoption
and then partial waiver of that immunity is not unreasonable.
DeFoor, 824 P. 2d at 795

(Rovira, J. concurring); Seifert v.

Standard Paving Co. , 64 111.2d 109, 355 N.E.2d 537, 539 (1976),
overruled on other grounds, Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of
Claims,

109

111.2d

72,

485

N.E.2d

Reorganized School Distr. R-2, 636

332

S.W.2d

(1985);

Winston

v.

324, 328 (Mo. 1982);

Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1986), appeal
dismissed, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987); see also Condemarin, 775 P.2d at
388 n.70 (Hall, C.J., dissenting) (since legislature could retain
absolute

immunity

for

torts

inflicted
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during

discharge

of

governmental function without violating state equal protection
guarantee, legislature can also constitutionally limit recovery
where immunity has been partially waived).
McCorvey's second classification raises an equal protection
argument never presented or argued in the trial court.

For that

reason, it should not even be addressed on the merits in this
appeal.

Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ, 797 P.2d 412, 413

(Utah 1990).

In any event, section 63-30-34(3)'s exception of

governmental takings of private property for public use from the
$250,000 damage cap is merely reflective of this Court's holding
that inverse condemnation suits are not subject to common law
governmental immunity principles or to the Governmental Immunity
Act and that article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution is
self-executing.

Farmer's New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful

City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243 n.l (Utah 1990); Colman v. Utah State
Land Bd. , 795 P.2d 622, 630-35 (Utah 1990).

Thus, the second

classification complained of by McCorvey is created by article I,
section 22 of the Utah Constitution itself, not by the challenged
statute.
The third classification McCorvey asserts is unreasonable is
that between persons with damages less than the statutory liability
limit and those whose damages exceed it.

This argument was

rejected in Seifert, 355 N.E.2d at 541, in which the Illinois
Supreme Court held that, since the legislature had created the
right of action of victims of government torts, it could set a
maximum amount recoverable in that action without violating equal
60

protection.
With regard to those persons injured in the exercise of a
governmental function, Utah's Governmental Immunity Act creates no
deprivations.

Instead, it grants a benefit equally by giving all

such persons the ability to sue a governmental entity where no such
action would otherwise exist.

All governmental tort victims are

likewise equally subject to section 63-30-34's limit on recoverable
damages.

There is nothing inherently unreasonable in the State's

consenting to be sued for otherwise immune activity only up to a
fixed amount.

On the contrary, such a limit (which is, in effect,

a legislative retention of immunity for an individual's damages
greater than $250,000) is eminently rational in light of the
magnitude and nature of the essential functions of government,
their concomitant huge potential for governmental liability, and
the effects of unlimited liability on the government's ability to
budget with some degree of certainty and to perform these functions
with available revenues.

Thus, the classification necessarily

created by a damage cap of any amount is not an unreasonable one.
Although not well articulated, McCorvey seems to be contending
that,

once

immunity

is

waived,

any

damage

cap

is

per

se

unreasonable.

In other words, "If I don't get to recover all my

damages

a

from

governmental

entity,

then

other

victims

of

governmental torts whose damages are less than $250,000 cannot
constitutionally be allowed to recover all their damages either."
Under

such a view, the

legislature

can

satisfy the uniform

operation of the laws provision only by choosing between the
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extreme options of absolute immunity or absolute liability.

This

position is not only unsupportable as a matter of constitutional
law, it also constitutes bad public policy.
Forced to choose between retention of absolute liability and
adoption

of

unlimited

liability

for

injuries

arising

from

governmental functions, the legislature would inevitably choose the
former so governmental entities could budget with enough certainty
to continue providing essential services, such as maintenance of
public

roads,

operation.

police

protection,

firefighting,

and

prison

This would result in no compensation for any person

injured in the government's discharge of a governmental function,
putting us back in the same position we were in in 1965, which the
Governmental Immunity Act was expressly intended to rectify.

In

choosing partial waiver of absolute immunity, only up to $250,000,
the

legislature

has

created

a classification

that

is not a

discrimination "with no rational basis," Mountain States Legal Fdn.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047, 1055 (Utah 1981), in light
of the constitutional permissibility of governmental

immunity

itself and the Governmental Immunity Act's purposes.
McCorvey

does

not

demonstrate

how

the

statutory

classifications, even if reasonable, nonetheless fail the second
and third parts of the applicable equal protection test, either
because the objectives of the legislative action are illegitimate
or

because

there

is

no

reasonable

relationship

between

legislative classification and the legislative purposes.
Cross and Blue Shield, 637 P.2d at 637.
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the
Blue

The

Governmental

Immunity

Act

is

designed,

and

was

deliberately intended, to balance two competing interests:

the

compensation of many victims of governmental tortfeasors who would
otherwise have no recourse if the governmental entity was engaged
in a governmental function, and the preservation of the public
treasury

from

unpredictable,

devastating

judgments

essential services can continue being provided.

so

that

The damage cap

serves these purposes and at the same time provides governmental
entities with the ability to plan for and pay for government
expenditures,
legislature.

which

was

also

a

major

concern

of

the

1965

See Kennedy & Lynch, "Some Problems of a Sovereign

Without Immunity," 36 So. Ca. L. Rev. 161, 177-78 (1963).

Only in

this way could the legislature open the door, but not all the way,
as the Act's proponents intended.
The need to preserve the public treasury and the need for a
reasonable degree of fiscal certainty in risk management and
budgeting for governmental functions without undue tax burdens are
the legitimate purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act's partial
waiver of absolute immunity only up to the damage cap in section
63-30-34.

DeFoor, 824 P.2d at 790; Lee, 718 P.2d at 226-27;

Stanhope, 280 N.W.2d at 719; Wilson, 753 P.2d at 1351-52.

By

limiting the liability of a public entity to a fixed amount, the
Governmental Immunity Act "protects the public entity against the
risk that unlimited and unforeseen judgments will deplete the
public

coffers and

result

in the termination

or

substantial

curtailment of important governmental functions." DeFoor, 824 P.2d
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at 790.17

As the Missouri Supreme Court has pointed out, the

legislature has a rational basis to fear that

full monetary

responsibility for any and all tort claims entails the risk of
insolvency or intolerable tax burdens. Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 328.
Limiting

recovery

allows

for

"fiscal

and

actuarial

planning

consonant with orderly stewardship of governmental funds," id.,
while permitting some recovery.
The same conclusion about the legitimacy of the legislative
purposes

behind

statutory

damage

caps

on

the

liability

of

governmental entities performing governmental functions has been
reached by numerous other courts that have likewise rejected state
and/or federal equal protection challenges to them.

E.g., Caulev,

403 So.2d at 387 ($50,000 cap); Jetton v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth.,
399 So. 2d 396, 399 (Fla. App.), review denied, 411 So.2d 383 (Fla.
1981) ($50,000 cap); Packard v. Joint School Distr., 104 Idaho 604,
661 P.2d 770 (App. 1983) ($100,000 cap); Estate of Caraill v.
Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 406 A.2d 704, 706-08 ($50,000 cap), appeal
dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1979); Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861,
867 (Minn. 1988) ($100,000 cap); Wilson v. Gipson, 753 P.2d 1349,
1352-53 (Okla. 1988) ($25,000 cap); Hale v. Portland, 308 Or. 508,
783 P.2d 506, 516 (1989) ($100,000 cap); Lvles v. Philadelphia, 88
Pa. Cmwlth. 509, 490 A.2d 936, 941 ($250,000 cap), aff'd, 512 Pa.
322, 516 A.2d 701 (1985); Wright v. Colleton County School Distr.,
391 S.E.2d at 570 ($250,000 cap); Texas Dept. of Mental Health v.
17

These are, of course, the same legitimate purposes served by
the doctrine of governmental immunity itself. Condemarin, 775 at
371-72 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Petty, 817 S.W.2 at 721) ($250,000 cap); Stanhope, 280 N.2d at 719
($25,000); Sambs v. Brookfield, 97 Wis.2d 356, 293 N.W.2d 504, 514
($25,000 cap), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980); contra Pfost v.
State, 219 Mont. 206, 713 P.2d 495, 504-05 (1985) (conservation of
public coffers not compelling state interest; result distinguished
as flowing from Montana constitution's rejection of governmental
immunity,

in Condemarin,

775 P.2d

at

381 n.39

(Hall,

C.J.,

dissenting)) .18
The reasonableness of the means chosen in section 63-30-34 to
achieve these purposes, i.e., the third part of the applicable
equal protection test, is addressed in the next section as part of
the due process analysis.
D.

THE DAMAGE CAP, IN A NONARBITRARY AMOUNT
REACHED THROUGH THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, IS
REASONABLY RELATED TO THE LEGITIMATE GOAL OF
COMPENSATING MOST VICTIMS OF GOVERNMENTAL
TORTFEASORS WHILE STILL PROTECTING THE PUBLIC
TREASURY FROM THE RISKS OF UNLIMITED LIABILITY
AND PROVIDING A REASONABLE BASIS FOR FISCAL
PLANNING AND RISK MANAGEMENT.

McCorvey contends that section 63-30-34's denial of full
compensation to governmental tort victims with damages greater than
$250,000 is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relationship to the
Act's purposes. Thus, he claims in his one paragraph of argument,
the statute violates the due process guarantee in article I,
section 7, which provides:

"No person shall be deprived of life,

liberty or property, without due process of law."
18

Since the

See generally Anno.# "Validity and Construction of Statute
or Ordinance Limiting the Kinds or Amount of Actual Damages
Recoverable in Tort Action Agamrt Governmental Unit," 43 A.L.R.4th
19, 29-34 (1986) and (Supp. 19^1).
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Governmental Immunity Act deprives McCorvey and other similarly
situated plaintiffs of nothing, but instead only grants to all such
persons equally the ability to sue and recover up to $250,000,
there

has

been

no

deprivation

triggering

any

but

the most

deferential due process scrutiny.
To the extent the legislature may not enact economic or social
legislation

that

creates

remedies

limited

in

some

cases

by

irrational or arbitrary line-drawing, a statutory damage cap is a
rational

means

of

achieving

the

legitimate

purposes

of

the

Governmental Immunity Act, and this particular $250,000 cap is not
arbitrary.

See Lee, 718 P.d at 228; Jetton, 399 So.2d at 399;

Packard, 661 P.2d at 775. McCorvey has failed to carry his burden
of

overcoming

the

statute's

presumptive

constitutionality

by

proving the contrary.
As noted above, a damage cap is the only rational way to serve
the competing purposes of the Utah Legislature's partial waiver of
absolute governmental immunity for governmental functions. A fixed
limit of liability at $250,000 is large enough to compensate most
injured persons and serve the deterrent function of tort liability,
while simultaneously protecting the public treasury from the risk
of insolvency or unfeasible tax burdens that would result from
catastrophic judgments. As the recent earthquake in San Francisco,
floods in Chicago, and riots in Los Angeles demonstrate, there is
already a hampered ability to predict the numbers of claims that
will

arise out

of a governmental

entity's

efforts

at

flood

management, bridge repair, and police protection, all governmental
66

functions.
A damage cap provides a crucial element of needed certainty.
It supplies a fixed amount on which to estimate future liability
based on the best estimate of numbers of claims, thereby enabling
governments to budget for the costs of self-insurance.

In this

way, it comprises a central part of the state's risk management
program.

As the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized, risk

management "requires that recovery be restricted at some finite
level

so

that

risk

exposure

can

be

underwriting decisions can be made."

projected

and

informed

Packard, 661 P.2d at 775.

Yearly actuarial studies establish the maximum cost of liability
for the next year, based on past loss experience and any visible
trends

in the numbers

and types of claims

filed, using the

assumption that no claim will cost more than the $250,000 limit.
Without a fixed dollar cap to cut off unlimited liability and
define the actuary's worst case scenario, there is no way to
project future losses realistically.
place, budgeting
expenditures

for self-insurance

could

not

be done with

In short, with no cap in
and all other government
any tolerable

level of

certainty.
The legislative history of 1983 Utah Laws ch. 130 shows clearly
that the amount of Utah's current cap, far from being arbitrary,
was reached through the difficult political process by compromises
between competing interests.

Utah's

cap is, in fact, $15,000

above the average of current statutory limits on governmental
entity liability in states whose legislatures have similarly acted
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to partially waive immunity only up to a fixed dollar amount.19
Deciding whether to give up sovereign immunity and, if so,
whether and where to draw the line of maximum recovery is not a
judicial function. As numerous courts have pointed out, it is the
role of the legislature, not the courts,
to evaluate the risks, the extent of exposure to
liability, the need to compensate citizens for injury,
the availability of and cost of insurance, and the
financial condition of the governmental units. It is the
legislature's function to structure statutory provisions,
which will protect the public interest in reimbursing the
victim and in maintaining government services and which
will be fair and reasonable to the victim and at the same
time will be realistic regarding the financial burden to
be placed on the taxpayers.
Sambs. 293 N.W.2d at 514; accord Leliefeld, 659 P.2d at 129;
Stanhope, 280 N.W. 2d at 719.
the

In short, it is not the province of

judiciary to second-guess elected

officials' weighing of

competing interests and their resolution of the difficult policy
19

Ala. Code § 11-93-2 (1975) ($100,000); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2410-114 (1988) ($150,000); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4012 (Supp.
1990) ($300,000); Fla. Stat. Ann. §768.28(5) (West Supp. 1992)
($100,000); Idaho Code § 6-926 (1984) ($500,000 per occurrence);
111. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, para. 439.8 (Smith-Hurd 1990) ($100,000);
Ind. Code. Ann. §34-4-16.5-4 (Burns 1986) ($300,000); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 75-6105 (1989) ($500,000 per occurrence); Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 44.070 (Michie 1986) ($100,000); Me. Rev. Stat, titl 14, §
8105 (West 1964) ($300,000 per occurrence); Md. Code Ann. § 5-399.2
(Supp. 1991) (limited to extent of insurance coverage); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 258, § 2 (West 1988) ($100,000); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
466.04 (Supp. 1992) ($200,000); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-15 (Supp.
1991) ($25,000 until July 1, 1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.035
(Supp. 1991) ($50,000); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-19 (Michie 1989)
($300,000); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-12.1-03 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000);
Okla. Stat. Ann. titl 51, § 154 (West Supp. 1992) ($100,000); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 30.270 (1991) ($100,000); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
8557 (1982) ($500,000); R. I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-2 (1985) ($100,000);
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-120 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000); Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code Ann. § 101.023 (West 1986) ($250,000); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 893.82(6) (West Supp. 1991) ($250,000); Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-118
(Supp. 1991) ($250,000).
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questions underlying a partial waiver of absolute governmental
immunity up to a fixed dollar amount.

See Sambs, 293 N.W.2d at

512; Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 377, 385, (Hall, C.J., dissenting).
Finally, section 63-30-34 is not arbitrary merely because it
precludes full recovery by those who, like McCorvey, are the most
seriously injured. Any damage cap will do so, precisely because it
is intended to do so. A cap high enough not to exclude any member
of this group from full recovery would, in fact, be no cap at all.
In rejecting a federal due process challenge to a statutory
liability limit for injuries arising from operation of nuclear
power plants, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
whatever ceiling figure is selected will, of necessity,
be arbitrary in the sense that any choice of a figure
based on imponderables like those at issue here can
always be so characterized. This is not, however, the
kind
of
arbitrariness
which
flaws
otherwise
constitutional action.
Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 86 (quoted in DeFoor, 824 P.2d at 790
n.12.
Likewise, Utah's recovery limit is not arbitrary, in the state
constitutional due process sense, and it is reasonably related to
achieving the Act's legitimate purposes.

As the legislative

history of the 1965 Governmental Immunity Act documents, partial
waiver of immunity is the result of the legislature's balancing of
the needs for essential, costly government services and reasonable
tax limits with the perceived need for some compensation of injured
tort claimants.

Numerous other courts have also concluded, in

rejecting state due process or equal protection challenges to
similar statutes, that there is a rational relationship between a
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damage cap and the legitimate purposes behind partial waivers of
absolute

governmental

functions.

immunity

for

some

or

all

governmental

In addition to the cases cited above under equal

protection analysis, see DeFoor, 824 P.2d at 790; Leliefeld, 659
P.2d at 128; Packard, 661 P.2d at 775; Sambs, 293 N.W.2d at 514;
Stanhope, 280 N.W.2d at 719; Wright, 391 S.E.2d at 570.
For these reasons, UDOT requests that this Court affirm the
trial court's ruling that McCorvey has failed to prove that section
63-30-34 violates equal protection or due process guaranteed by the
Utah Constitution.
B.

McCORVEY'S CLAIM THAT THE DAMAGE CAP VIOLATES
HIS ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT
RAISED BELOW AND IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED ON
APPEAL. IN ANY EVENT, THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
DOES NOT APPLY TO AN ACTION, SUCH AS THIS ONE,
THAT WAS NOT MAINTAINABLE AT COMMON LAW. IF
APPLICABLE, THERE IS NO DENIAL OF THE RIGHT
PROTECTED BY SECTION 10 BECAUSE THE JURY IS
PERMITTED TO FIND THE FACTS AND ASSESS
DAMAGES, NOTWITHSTANDING SECTION 63-30-34.

McCorvey asserts that the damage cap violates his right to
jury trial guaranteed

by article

I, section

10 of the Utah

Constitution. This claim should not be addressed on appeal because
it was never raised in the trial court.
In

addition, McCorvey's

brief

on

Espinal, 797 P.2d at 413.

appeal

provides

completely

inadequate analysis and supporting authority for his constitutional
claim, which is an alternative reason for refusing to address the
issue.

State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989).

On the merits, this claim should be rejected.

Section 10

does not create rights or remedies any more than the open courts
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provision in section 11 does.

The right to jury trial in section

10 applies only to cases cognizable at common
constitution was adopted.

law when our

Zion's First Nat'l Bank v. Rocky Mt.

Irrigation. 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990).

Here, section 63-30-34

cannot violate the section 10 right to jury trial where there would
have been no right of action at all at common law against a
governmental entity discharging a governmental function. Seifert.
355 N.E.2d at 541. Furthermore, the damage cap in section 63-30-34
merely sets the outer limits of a governmental tort victim's remedy
in a legislatively created cause of action.

It does not deny

access to the courts, and it does not prevent the jury from finding
the facts and assessing a plaintiff's damages, which is the crux of
the right to jury trial.

Wright, 391 S.E.2d at 569-70; Bovd v.

Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989). Thus, section 63-30-34 does
not deny plaintiffs in McCorvey's circumstances a right to jury
trial protected by article I, section 10.
F.

IF THE DAMAGE CAP IN SECTION 63-30-34 IS HELD
VIOLATIVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THIS COURT
MUST ALSO INVALIDATE THE BALANCE OF THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, INCLUDING THE
WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY IN SECTIONS 63-30-8 AND
-10, AS NOT SEVERABLE FROM SECTION 63-30-34.
WITHOUT A VALID STATUTORY WAIVER OF ABSOLUTE
COMMON LAW IMMUNITY FOR INJURIES ARISING OUT
OF THE PERFORMANCE OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION,
PLAINTIFF McCORVEY CAN RECOVER NOTHING FROM
UDOT, AND THE JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST UDOT
MUST BE VACATED ACCORDINGLY.

If the Court accepts McCorvey's constitutional arguments based
on Condemarin and holds that section 63-30-34 violates the Utah
Constitution by limiting recovery by a person injured as a result
of a governmental entity's performance of a governmental function,
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the Court must next consider the issue of severability.
Where

part

severability

of

an

question

legislative intent.

is

enactment

is

primarily

unconstitutional,

answered

by

the

determining

Berry, 717 P.2d at 687 (Utah 1985); Salt Lake

City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 791
(Utah 1977).

To do so, the appellate court asks whether the

balance of the enactment, other than the portion struck down, can
stand alone and serve its legitimate legislative purpose.

Utah

Technology Fin. Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 414 (Utah 1986);
Berry, 717 P.2d at 687; State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah
App. 1990).
In this case, the Governmental Immunity Act legislatively
adopted governmental immunity, then waived that immunity in some
circumstances but capped the liability at a dollar limit.

The

statute was designed to waive immunity only partially by creating
a limited cause of action.

It is apparent from this structure of

the Act itself, and from its legislative history, supra at pages
32-38, that the damage cap in section 63-30-34 is an integral part
of this enactment and is, therefore, not severable. Salt Lake City
v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d at 791.

It is

indisputable that the Utah Legislature would not have enacted the
Governmental Immunity Act and created a cause of action against
governmental

entities

performing

governmental

functions

(in

sections 63-30-8 and -10) if, in doing so, it were subjecting
governmental entities to unlimited liability.
at

686

(entire

Utah

Product

Liability
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See Berry, 717 P.2d

Act

struck

down

as

inseverable

where

section

setting

forth

statute

of

repose

invalidated as constitutional). The waiver of immunity and damage
cap provisions were enacted as a package and are inextricably
interrelated.

In such a circumstance, "it is not within the scope

of the court's function to select the valid portions of the act and
make

conjecture

the

legislature

intended

they

independent of the portions which are invalid."

should

stand

Salt Lake City v.

International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d at 791.
In any event, the legislative history of the Governmental
Immunity Act rules out any such conjecture.

The Utah Legislature

plainly did not intend that a plaintiff in McCorvey's position
could have the benefits of the Act's waiver provisions without also
being subject to the recovery limitations in section 63-30-34.
Standing alone, the waiver of immunity portions of the Act cannot
stand independently and serve the legislature's purposes.
111 P.2d at 688.

Berry,

Accordingly, the balance of the Act must be

struck down if this Court holds that the Utah Legislature irw**: not,
consistent with the Utah Constitution, prohibit one injured in the
course of a governmental entity's performance of a governmental
function from recovering, in a statutorily created right of action,
all the damages attributed by the jury to the responsible entity.
Without any valid statutory waiver of governmental immunity
and statutory creation of a right of action, McCorvey's ability to
sue or recover from UDOT in this case is controlled by the common
law doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Under the relevant case law,

supra at pages 39-46, there is no right of action to recover
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anything from a governmental entity for injuries arising out of
public highway maintenance, a governmental function. Accordingly,
the judgment entered in this case against UDOT must be vacated, and
McCorvey should take nothing.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above in Part II, sections A-E, UDOT
requests that this Court affirm the judgment below and hold that,
in limiting the personal injury liability of a governmental entity
discharging a governmental function, the $250,000 per person damage
cap in section 63-30-34 does not violate any of the enumerated
provisions of the Utah Constitution.
Court

concludes

statutory

dollar

that

section

limit

on

On the other hand, if the

63-30-34

the

is

damages

invalid

because a

recoverable

from

a

governmental entity, even one performing a governmental function,
violates any provision of the Utah Constitution, the Governmental
Immunity Act should be struck down in its entirety as inseverable
from section

63-30-34, and the judgment against UDOT vacated

accordingly.
Respectfully submitted this l4H* day of July, 1992.
R. Paul Van Dam
Utah Attorney General

Annina M. Mitchell (2274)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for UDOT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on July jUii , 1992, I caused true and
correct copies of the foregoing Reply and Response Brief of UDOT to
be mailed, with first class postage prepaid, to: David R. Olsen and
Jesse C. Trentadue, Attorneys for Daniel B. McCorvey, at Suitter
Axland Armstrong & Hanson, 175 South West Temple, 700 Clark Leaming
Center, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480.
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ADDENDA

ATJENDUM A

63-30-34. Limit of judgment against governmental* entity
or employee.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages for
personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in
any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of
whether or not the function giv:ng rise to the injury is characterized as governmental.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for property damage
against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court
shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental.
(3) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages
awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged
private property without just compensation.

ADDENDUM B

David R. Olsen, Esq. (#2458)
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq. (#4691)
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Defendant McCorvey
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VAUN PAUL PAGE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DANIEL B. MCCORVEY; STATE OF
UTAH; LeGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; and P. WAYNE
WRIGHT,

]
I
I
I
I
]
;

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE
MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANT
STATE OF UTAH'S OBJECTION
TO JURY VERDICT

Defendants.
i

Civil No. C87-4304

I

Civil No. C88-1818

i

Judge Michael R. Murphy

DANIEL B. MCCORVEY,
Plaintiff,

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION and LeGRAND
JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

]

LeGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
P. WAYNE WRIGHT, individually,
Third-Party
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
The State of Utah (herein "State") has objected to
the form of the judgment claiming that its damages are limited
to $250,000 by Utah Code Annotated S 63-30-34(1). The damage cap
has been declared unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court in
Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989)
(Exhibit "A" hereto).

According to the Condemarin Court, the

statutory damage cap is unconstitutional because it denies the
seriously injured plaintiff equal access to the courts and it is
violative of Article I, Sections 11 and 24 of the Utah Constitution.

TACTS
1.

The State contracted with LeGrand Johnson Con-

struction Company (herein "Contractor") to chip seal Interstate15 near Cove Port, Utah.
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2.

The contract required the Contractor to provide

a traffic control plan for the project.
3.

(Exhibit "BH hereto).

The Contractor failed to provide a traffic control

plan for this project.

Instead, the Contractor accepted a plan

which the State had on file, but only after it had reviewed and
commented on the plan.
4.

(Testimony of H. Paul Johnson).

The Contract also required the Contractor to main-

tain public liability insurance which was in force and applicable
to this project.

A copy of its insurance policy had to be pro-

vided to the State prior to the award of the Contract.

(Exhibit

"C" hereto).
5.

The contract likewise required the Contractor

to indemnify the State for injuries or damages to the public
resulting from the Contractor's neglect. An indemnity provision
exists in this instance because the Contract speficially incorporated the Special Provisions which in turn incorporated by
reference the State of Utah's Standard Specifications for Road
and Bridge Construction wherein an indemnity provision is contained in § 107.14. The Contract, Special Provisions and § 107.14
of the Standard Specifications are attached hereto as Exhibits
"D" through "F".
6.

Daniel McCorvey's actual injuries exceed the stat-

utory cap by $3,671,282.

Interrogatory V, Special Verdict.
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I.

THE STATUTORY CAP IS WCQFSTITVTCTAL.
The Utah Supreme Court has declared the statutory cap
unconstitutional.

Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d

348 (Utah 1989).

The Condemarin Court ruled that the statute

deprived the severely injured from open access to the courts,
pursuant to Art. I# SS 11 and 24 of the Utah Constitution.

The

Utah Supreme Court reasoned in Condemarin that the cap created
an impermissible distinction between victims of governmental
tortfeasors:
[T]he recovery cap created a distinction
between victims of governmental tortfeasors,
depending on the severity of their injuries:
the mildly injured received all; the moderately injured, most; and the severely injured,
only a fraction or none of their economic
and/or non-economic damages.
775 P.2d at 353.
Applying a balancing test in Condemarin. the Supreme
Court ruled that the governmental interest in limiting its liability paled in light of the importance of the individual right
being compromised —

the right to compensation for severe in-

juries. Under this balancing test, the Court held that the statutory cap which caused a limited few to bear alone the burden of
significant injuries was unconstitutional.

4 -

II.
THE RATIONALE FOR A STATUTORY CAP
MAKES NO SENSE IN THIS CASE,
The unfairness of an argument for a statutory cap is
clearly evidenced by this case.

The Contract required the Con-

tractor to provide a traffic control plan.
the Contractor to maintain insurance.

It also required

Despite these specific

mandates, the State decided to participate in the process and
submitted a totally inadequate plan.

Had the State honored its

Contract and required the Contractor to perform as written, Daniel
McCorvey would have been fully compensated.

The Contractor has

adequate insurance to pay the verdict. Instead, the State argues
that because it negligently involved itself in the traffic control
plan, Daniel McCorvey should remain uncompensated for his actual
damages.

There is no logic or reason to such a position.

The

State acted as a volunteer and did something that a private party
was clearly obligated to do and had agreed to do by Contract.
The seriously injured McCorvey should not be deprived of his
remedy because of the unnecessary meddling of the State.

There

is no clear social or economic evil which needs to be eliminated
at Daniel McCorvey's expense.
This case also illustrates the potential for the manipulation of a victim's recovery.

As argued during the trial,

the State's apparent willingness to accept responsibility for
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the Contractor's actions must be viewed as an artifice to deprive
Daniel McCorvey of compensation•

Liability is shifted from the

Contractor who can pay, to the State who can assert a liability
cap defense to a just verdict. This reduces the amount which the
Contractor must pay as indemnity to Daniel McCorvey's detriment.
Such a result highlights the valid concerns of the Utah Supreme
Court in Condemarin. The burden of protecting the State's treasury and the Contractor's insurance carrier falls exclusively
on those most in need of protection —

the severely injured*

CONTUSION
Section 63-30-34 is unconstitutional. There is no basis
to reduce the award of damages to Daniel McCorvey.
DATED this

'f^""day of December, 1990.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON

DAVID R: OLSEN, Esq.
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff McCorvey
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ADDENDUM C

Tfcird J'jdiCjaJ District

DEC 1 0 1990

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VAUN PAUL PAGE,

SUMMARY DECISION
CASE NO.

Plaintiff,

C-87-4304

vs.
DANIEL B. MCCORVEY; STATE OF
UTAH; LEGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; and P. WAYNE
WRIGHT,
Defendants.

DANIEL B. MCCORVEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION and LEGRAND
JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

Plaintiff

has

submitted

a

form

defendants have objected to the form.

of

judgment

and

the

A hearing was conducted

on the objection and the court resolved on the record all
issues relating to interest.

The court, however, took under

advisement the question of the applicability of the statutory

PAGE V. MCCORVEY

PAGE TWO

SUMMARY DECISION

cap of $250,000 on damage judgments against the State of Utah.
On the evening of November 21, 1990, the jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff of $5,421,282 and found that the
relative fault of the State was 28% of the total.

Under normal

circumstances, the State would thereby be liable for just
over $1.5 million of the total verdict.

The State, however,

asserts that Section 63-30-34(1), Utah Code Ann., applies and
maximizes

its liability

at

$250,000.00.

Plaintiff

contends

that the Supreme Court's ruling in Condemarin v. University
Hospital. 775 P2d 348

(Utah 1989) renders the statutory cap

unconstitutional as it applies to this case.

This court, then,

must determine the applicability of the Condemarin case to the
verdict in the instant case.
There were three opinions
statutory cap unconstitutional.
Durham

expressly

limited

the

in Condemarin which held the
The lead opinion of Justice
applicability

of

the

result.

Justice Durham stated:
[T]he holding of the Court is
limited to the following: the
recovery limits statutes are
unconstitutional as applied to
the University Hospital. 775
P2d at 366.

/*'

rri
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PAGE THREE

SUMMARY DECISION

Three of the four separate opinions in Condemarin expressly
acknowledged

that

the

common

law at the time

of the Utah

Constitution incorporated the principle of sovereign immunity.
775 P2d at 349, 351, 370-71, 383.

Two of the three opinions of

the majority, however, focused on the proposition that only
governmental

functions,

as

functions, were immune.

distinguished

from

proprietary

775 P2d at 351-52, 370-71.

appear, then, that the majority viewed

It would

the opportunity

for

recovery by a person injured by the government in the exercise
of

proprietary

or

fundamental right.

nonessential

government

functions

as

a

It furthermore appears that **he majority

perceived the governme-

activities before it, the operation of

University Hospital, as nonessential government

services and

thus treated the plaintiff's right to recover as a substantial
or fundamental right. 775 P2d at 351-52, 370-71.
Because the majority was so focused on limiting its ruling
to the activities of University Hospital, it is necessary for
this

court

recover

to

against

determine
the

whether

government

the
is

plaintiff's
a

right

fundamental

to

right.

Correspondingly, it is necessary for this court to determine
whether the State's activities

in this case were essential

governmental functions or what have traditionally been labeled
proprietary functions.
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The

PAGE FOUR

activities

challenged

SUMMARY DECISION

in

the

instant

case,

road

maintenance, are ones which have been traditionally immune as
essential governmental functions. See Richards v. Leavitt. 716
P2d 276 (Utah 1985) and cases cited therein.

The government is

thus liable for damages in connection with its road maintenance
activities

only

if

the

government

waives

immunity.

As

a

consequence, the right of the plaintiff in this case to recover
against the government, as distinguished from the right of the
plaintiff

in

Condemarin,

constitutional

is

analysis

inapplicable.

Not

only

not

of
is

a

fundamental

Condemarin

the

right.

is

constitutional

The

therefore
analysis

in

Condemarin inapplicable, two of the opinions of the majority
suggest that, in a case such as this involving the performance
of

governmental

recovery.

functions, there

against

right

to

unlimited

indication

that the

plaintiff's

recovery

775 P2d at 352, 371-72.

This court, then,
statutory

is no

cap
the

is

is left with an

applicable

government

governmental functions.

in

to
its

this

performance

of

essential

Plaintiff's contentions must also be

considered in light of the presumptive constitutionality of the
challenged statute and the need to resolve any doubt in
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favor

of

SUMMARY DECISION

PAGE FIVE

constitutionality,

Timpanoaos

Planning

&

Water

Management Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist., 690
P2d 562, 564 (Utah 1984); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275
Ind. 520, 530, 418 N.E. 2d 207, 213-14 (1981).
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

provisions

of

Section

63-30-34(1), Utah Code Ann., are applicable to the verdict and
reduce the recovery against the State of Utah to $250,000.00.
The court reached this conclusion before the close of business
on Friday, December 7, 1990 and signed and entered a judgment
consistent with this decision.
Dated this f 0

day of December, 1990.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ADDENDUM D

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
H. J. R. No. 21.

(Passed March 14, 1963.)

A Joint Resolution of the 35th Legislature of the State of Utah Making
an Assignment to the Utah Legislative Council to Study Waiver of
Governmental Immunity from Suit and Consent of the State and its
Political Subdivisions to be Liable for the Torts of Their Agents;
Providing for a Committee Appointed by the Council and Requesting
an Appropriation for the Study.
Be it resolved by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
WHEREAS, the State of Utah, including its political subdivisions,
is generally immune from suit having waived its immunity only with
respect to specific kinds of actions, and
WHEREAS, governmental immunity from suit may result in hardship to persons who may be injured or whose property may be damaged, and
WHEREAS, it is desirable to investigate and study the experience
of other states and of various proposals for a waiver of immunity and
permitting consent to liability for torts of agents,
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Legislative Council investigate and study the effects upon the state and its political subdivisions of waiver of immunity from suit and consent to be liable for
the torts of their officers, employees and agents, together with the
most workable statutes and procedures for carrying out such legislation
and to make recommendations to the 36th Legislature.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Legislative Council appoint
a committer to assist with the study of not to exceed twenty-five members, *to inciude at least two members recommended by the Governor,
two members appointed by the President of the Senate, two members
appointed by the Speaker of the House, two members of the Utah
Municipal League, two members of the County Officers' Association,
two members representing the Public School Districts, two members
of Special Improvement Districts, two representatives from the Utah
State Bar, and the remaining members citizens at large. Not less than
one-third of the membership of the committee shall be members of the
state legal profession.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Legislative Council shall
finance this study, including staff services for research and expenses
of members of the committee and for clerical and office expenses, from
appropriations made by the Legislature and from contributions from
political subdivisions of state government and other public supported
agencies.

ADDENDUM E

STATE OF UTAH
Report and Recommendations of
the Utah Legislative Council
1963-1965

PURSUANT TO TITLE 36, CHAPTER 4, SECTIONS 2
AND 11, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
DECEMBER, 1964
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the court in habitual truancy cases, clarification of the role of the probation officer, provision for some publicity in major delinquency cases,
clarification of the general purpose statement, definitions of neglected
and dependent child, qualifications of the probation staff, additional judgeship for the second district and appointive powers of the senior judge, also,
designation of the chief probation officer and defining action where adults
contribute to the delinquency of a juvenile.
The Committee recommends the Juvenile Court Act as representing an
effective, efficient, and conscientious effort on the part of well-qualified
individuals who have worked to prepare a bill in the best interests of the
State.

Governmental Immunity
The 1963 Legislature directed the Council "to study the effects upon
states, their political subdivisions and municipal corporations of waiver
of immunity from suit and consenting to be liable for the torts of its
officers, employees, and agents as outlined in H.J.R. 21 of the 35th
Legislature." (S.J.R. 14, item 2.)

The Legislature considered this study

of such importance that it separately appropriated the sum of $25,000 and
directed the Council to appoint a committee with at least one-third of the
membership from the legal profession.

The Council appointed a committee of

twenty-one members, with representation from the Legislature, the cities,
counties, special taxing districts, school districts and other interests.
Bills have previously been introduced in the Legislature to r.aive
governmental immunity.

In 1961 a bill was passed, then vetoed by the

Governor and in 1963 a bill was introduced but failed to pass.
Research activities include field investigations, gathering of data,
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assimilation of information, formulation of proposals, drafting of legislation, and the preparation of a final report.

Investigations of the claims

experience of the State and its political subdivisions has been included in
the Committee study.

The extent of insurance coverage by governmental entities,

the cost of such insurance and claims experience have been part of the study.
Questionnaires were sent to other states in regard to tort claims and consequential damage claims.
catalogued.

The statutes of other states have been reviewed and

The Utah Code has been carefully examined, section by section.

Case decisions have been studied.

Conferences have been held with insurance

personnel and rating information has been obtained from the National Bureau
of Casualty Underwriters.

Seven working drafts of legislation have been pre-

pared and studied by the staff, by Committee members, and by the Executive
Committee.
The Committee considered the important questions of whether governmental
immunity from suit was important in the State and whether legislation was
needed.
Numerous citizens have been injured in their person and property by
negligent acts of government employees and by the construction of public
improvements.

In many of these cases no recourse against the governmental

entity has been possible.

It was found that the present system works sub-

stantial injustice to citizens.

There is a fear, however, among government

officials, that to open the door to unrestrained claims would be too burdensome upon governmental funds.
The Committee concluded that immunity of governmental entities should
be waived in relation to responsibility for the negligent acts or omissions
of public employees.

The Committee was not unanimous in its opinion regard-

ing responsibility for consequential damage.

This latter type of claim is
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for indirect or consequential damage resulting from the construction of public improvements.

It is not necessarily the result of any negligence but is

merely the consequence of a particular government activity.
The question of payment of claims was a matter of concern to the Committee.
It was found that there is already a limited waiver of immunity in the State.
For example, cities and towns can be sued and must respond in relation to defective streets, sidewalks, culverts, and bridges.

The State Road Commission

has discretionary authority to pay individual claims up to $3,000 for injuries
resulting from the negligence of its employees.

The Fish and Game Commission

must pay for crop damage resulting from wildlife.

It was also found that

83% of the political subdivisions responding to the survey already carry automobile insurance, and 30% of those carry comprehensive liability insurance.
On the basis of the best experience available, it appears that vehicle
insurance premiums and costs will show little increase should immunity be
waived, but there may be an increase of as much as five to six times in the
cost of general liability insurance.

There would probably be more claims

filed and some additional administrative costs incurred in handling these
claims.
There was unanimous approval by the committee members that governmental
entities should be legally authorized to purchase liability insurance to protect both the entity and the employee.
At the present time claims against the State are reviewed by the Board
of Examiners and then passed on to the Legislature for its review and appropriation or refusal.

If a state agency is not otherwise authorized by law to

pay claims, then the authority of the Board of Examiners must be recognized
and claims must be channelled through the Board.
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The Committee has prepared a draft of legislation patterned after that
adopted in California and in some other states.

This legislation reaffirms

the rule of governmental immunity, thus eliminating any confusion in the law,
and then carves out specific exceptions where, as a matter of justice, immunity from suit should be waived.
or unique rules of substantive
concerned.

No effort is made in the bill to create new
liability as far as governmental agencies are

Where immunity is waived, liability or responsibility would then

be determined by the courts.
A second bill has been prepared which is simply an authorization for the
permissive purchase of liability insurance.
immunity.

This latter bill does not waive

It would solve the problem of immunity only insofar as the govern-

mental entity chooses to purchase liability insurance, thereby referring all
claims to an insurance carrier.
If the Legislature meets the question of governmental immunity head-on,
it can consider the comprehensive draft which defines specific exceptions to
immunity and also provides for insurance coverage.

The second draft merely

permits the purchase of insurance coverage by the governmental entities.
The Committee recommends legislation to solve the problem of governmental immunity.

Justice of Peace
A follow-up to the study made by a State Bar Committee prior to the
1963 Legislature to determine the advisability of reforming the J. P. system
was assigned to a committee of the Council.

The Committee believes legisla-

tion is needed to accomplish the objectives of the assignment.

The J. P.

system is in need of reform and the Committee is preparing legislation to
permit the establishment of "community courts.11

ADDENDUM F

Ch. 139
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ing before the commission or before such member.
(B) The commission is authorized to secure directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent
establishment or instrumentality, information suggestions, estimates and
statistics for the purpose of this act and each such department, bureau,
agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment or instrumentality is authorized and directed to furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the commission upon request made by the chairman or vice-chairman.
Section 12. Effective Date.
This act shall take effect on March 25,1965.

CHAPTER 139
S. B. 4

(In Effect July 1, 1966)

GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY
An Act Relating to the Immunity of the State, Its Agencies and Political
Subdivision from Actions at Law; Providing for Exemption Thereto,
for the Purchase of Liability Insurance, and for the Payment of Claims
and Judgments.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Governmental
Immunity Act."
Section 2. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) The word "state" shall mean the state of Utah or any office,
department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university or other instrumentality thereof;
(2) The words "political subdivision" shall mean any county, city,
town, school district, special improvement or taxing district, or any
other political subdivision or public corporation;
(3) The words "governmental entity" shall mean and include the
state and its political subdivisions as defined herein;
(4) The word "employee" shall mean and include any officer, employee or servant of a governmental entity;
(5) The word "claim" shall mean any claim brought against a governmental entity or its employee as permitted by this act;
(6) The word "injury" means death, injury to a person, damage
to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer
to his person, or* estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private
person or his agent.
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Section 3. General Immunity in Exercise of Governmental Functions.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental
entities shall be immune from suit for any injury which may result from the activities of said entities wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function.
Section 4. Construction of Act—Consent to Suit Based on Waiver of
Immunity.
Nothing contained in this act, unless specially provided is to be
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as governmental entities are concerned. Wherein immunity from
suit is waived by this act, consent to be sued is granted and liability
of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
Section 5. Immunity Waived: Contractual Obligations.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any
contractual obligation.
Section 6. Immunity Waived: Property and Related Transactions.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for' the
recovery of any property real or personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other' liens
thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or secure and adjudication touching any mortgage or other lien said entity may have
or claim on the property involved.
Section 7. Immunity Waived: Negligent Operation of Vehicle or
Equipment by Agent—Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a
motor vehicle or other equipment while in the scope of his employment; provided, however, that this section shall not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while being driven
in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah, 1961.
Section 8. Immunity Waived: Defective or Dangerous Conditions of
Roads and Walks.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any
injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge,
viaduct or other structure located thereon.
Section 9. Immunity Waived: Defective or Dangerous Conditions of
Buildings and Other Structures.
Immunity from suit of al- governmental entities is waived for any
injury caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public
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building, structure, dam, reservoir' or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for latent defective conditions.
Section 10. Immunity Waived: Negligent Injury—Exceptions:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of his employment except if the
injury:
(1) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion
is abused, or
(2) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slan*^r. deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, invasion of rights of privacy, or civil rights, or
(3) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of,
V>r by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or' revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization, or
(5) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause, or
(6) arises out of a misrepresentation by said employee whether
or not such is negligent or intentional, or
(7) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public
(4) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of
making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property, or
demonstrations, mob violence and civil disturbances, or
(8) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes, or
(9) arises out of the activities of the National Guard, or
(10) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state
prison, county or city jail or other place of legal confinement, or
(11) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result
of any activity by the state land board.
Section 11. Appropriate Relief Authorized—Damages.
Any person having a claim for injury to person or property against
a governmental entity or its employee may petition said entity for
any appropriate relief including the award of money damages.
Section 12. One-Year Limitation on Actions Against State.
A claim against the state or any agency thereof as defined herein
shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed with the attorney general of the state of Utah and the agency concerned within one
year after the cause of action arises.
Section 13. Limitation on Actions Against Political Subdivisions—Law
Governing Claims Against City or Incorporated Town.
A claim against a political subdivision shall be forever barred unless
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notice thereof is filed within ninety days after the cause of action
arises; provided, however, that any claim against a city or incorporated
town under Section 8 shall be governed by the provisions of Section
10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Section 14. Approval of Claim Within 90 Days.
Within 90 days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity
or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in
writing of its approval oi^ denial. A claim shall be deemed to have
been denied if at the end of the 90-day period the governmental entity
or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim.
Section 15. Action in Court Upon Denial—Action Within One Year.
If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an a c t i o n in the
district court against the governmental entity in those circumstances
where immunity from suit has been wraived as in the act provided.
Said action must be commenced within one year after denial or the
denial period as specified herein.
Section 16. Jurisdiction of District Courts—Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
any action brought under this act and such actions shall be governed
by the Utah rules of civil procedure insofar as they are consistent
with this act.
Section 17. Venue of Actions.
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in which
the cause of action arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against a
county may be brought in the county in which the cause of action
arose, or in t h e defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a district court judge of the defendant county, in any county contiguous
to the defendant county. Said leave may be granted ex parte. Actions
against all other political subdivisions including cities and towns, shall
be brought in the county in which said political subdivision is located
or in the county in which the cause of action arose.
Section 18. Compromise and Settlement.
The governmental entity, after conferring with its legal officer or
other legal counsel if it has no such officer, may compromise anH
settle any action as to the damages or other relief sought.
Section 19. Plaintiffs Undertaking for Costs.
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but in no case less than the sum
of $300, conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs
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incurred by the governmental entity in the action if the plaintiff fail"
to prosecute the action or fails to recover judgment.
Section 20. Judgment Bars Further Action in Subject Matter.
Judgment against a governmental entity in an action brought under
this act shall constitute a complete bar' to any action by the claimant.
by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee whoso
act or omission gave rise to the claim.
Section 21. Bar of Claims by United States or Other State Under Act.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, no claim hereunder shall be brought by the United States or by any other state,
territory, nation or governmental entity.
Section 22. Punitive Damages Prohibited—Execution, Attachment, and
Garnishment Barred Against State.
No judgment shall be rendered against the governmental entity
for exemplory or punitive damages; nor shall execution, attachment
or garnishment issue against the governmental entity.
Section 23. Payment of Claims and Judgments.
Any claim approved by the state as defined herein or any final
judgment obtained against the state shall be presented to the office,
agency, institution or other instrumentality involved for payment
if payment by said instrumentality is otherwise permitted by law. If
such payment is not authorized by law then said judgment or claim shall
be presented to the board of examiners and the board shall proceed
as provided in Section 63-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Section 24. Payment of Claims to Be Paid From General Funds.
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or any final judgment obtained against a political subdivision shall be submitted to
the governing body thereof to be paid forthwith from the general
funds of said political subdivision unless said funds are appropriated
to some other use or restricted by law or* contract for other pu:r ^s.
Section 25. Payment of Claim in Installments Authorized.
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during the
current fiscal year it may pay the claim or award in not more than
ten ensuing annual installments of equal size or in such other installments as are agreeable to the claimant.
Section 26. Reserve Funds for Claims or Liability Insurance.
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve fund
or may jointly with one or more political subdivisions make contributions to a joint reserve fund, for the purpose of making payment of
claims against the cooperating subdivisions when they become pay-
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able pursuant to this act, or for the purpose of purchasing liability
Insurance to protect the cooperating subdivisions fr'om any or all risks
created by this act.
Section 27. Authority of Political Subdivision to Levy Tax for Claims
and Judgments.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary all political subdivisions shall have authority to levy an annual property tax
in the amount necessary to pay any claims, settlements or judgments secured pursuant to the provisions hereof, or to pay the costs
to defend against same, or for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a reserve fund for the payment of such claims, settlements or
judgments as may be reasonably anticipated, or to pay the premium
for such insurance as herein authorized, even though as a result of
such levy the maximum levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded
thereby; provided, that in no event shall such levy exceed Vz mill nor
shall the revenues deilved therefrom be used for any other purpose than
those stipulated herein.
Section 28. Authority of Government Entities to Purchase Insurance.
Any governmental entity within the state of Utah may purchase
insurance against any risk which may arise as a result of the application of this act.
Section 29. Minimum Amounts of Insurance Purchased by Government
Entities.
Every policy ox" contract of insurance purchased by a governmental
entity as permitted under the provisions of this chapter shall provide:
(a) In respect to bodily injury liability that the insurance carrier
shall pay on behalf of the insured governmental entity all sums which the
insured would in the absence of the defense of governmental immunity
be legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, sustained by any
person, caused by accident, and arising out of the ownership, maintenance and use of automobiles, or arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of premises, and all operations necessary or incidental
thereto, or* in respect to other operations and caused by accident subject to a limit, exclusive of interest and costs, of not less than $100,000
because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident
and, subject to said limit for one person, to a limit of not less than
$300,000 because of bodily injury or death of two or more persons in
any one accident.
(b) In respect to property damage liability that the insurance carrier shall pay on behalf of the insured governmental entity all sums
which the insured would in the absence of the defense of governmental
immunity be legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to
or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by
accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance and use of
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automobiles, or arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of
premises, and all operations necessary or incidental thereto, or in respect to other operations and caused by accident to a limit of not less
than $50,000 because of injury to or destruction of property of others
in any one accident.
Section 30. Insurer to Agree Not to Assert Defense of Sovereign Immunity.
Every contract or policy of insurance purchased under the terms
of this act for any or all risks created by this act shall include a provision or endorsement by which the insurer agrees not to assert the
defense of sovereign immunity, and to pay all sums for which it would
otherwise be liable under its contract or policy of insurance.
Section 31. Severable Validity of Insurance Contracts.
Any insurance policy, aider or endorsement hereafter issued and
purchased to insure against any risk which may arise as a result
of the application of this act, which contains any condition cr provision not in compliance with the requirements of the act, shall not
be rendered invalid thereby, but shall be construed and applied in accordance with such conditions and provisions as would have applied had
such policy, rider or endorsement been in full compliance with this act,
provided the policy is otherwise valid.
Section 32. Insurance to Be Subject to Public Bid.
No contract or policy of insurance may be purchased under this
chapter or renewed under this act except upon public bid to be let
to the lowest and best bidder.
Section 33. Authority of Government Entity to Insure Against Negligence of Agents.
A governmental entity may insure any or' all of its employees
against all or any part of his liability for injury or damage resulting from a negligent act or omission in the scope of his employment
regardless of whether or not said entity is immune from suit for said
act or omission, and any expenditure for such insurance is herewith
declared to be for a public purpose.
Section 34. Judgment in Excess of Minimum Amounts.
If any judgment or award against a governmental entity under
Sections 7, 8, 9, and 10 of this act exceeds the minimum amounts
for bodily injury and property damage liability specified in Section 29 of this act, the court shall reduce the amount of said judgment or award to a sum equal to said minimum requirements unless the
governmental entity has secured insurance coverage in excess of said
minimum requirements in which event the court shall reduce the amount
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of said judgment or award to a sum equal to the applicable limits provided in the insurance policy.
Section 35. Severability Clause.
If any section, part or parts of this act shall be held to be unconstitutional, such unconstitutionality shall not affect the validity of
the remainder of this act.
Section 36. Conflicting Statutes Repealed.
All other acts or statutes in conflict with provisions of this act
are repealed as of the effective date of this act.
Section 37. Effective Date.
This act shall take effect on July 1,- 1966, and shall apply only to
claims and actions arising after said date.

CHAPTER 140
H. B. 15

(In Effect May 11, 196o)

STATE FAIR ASSOCIATION—POWERS
An Act Amending Section 64-4-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to Provide
That Moneys Received From Conversion of Real and Personal Property
by the Utah State Fair Association, and Paid Into the State Treasury
and Placed to the Credit of the State Fair Association Maintenance
Fund, Shall Not Lapse at the End of a Biennium but be Continued on
Into the Next Biennium: and Section 64-4-7, Utah Code Annotated
1953, to Provide That Moneys Received From Leasing of the Association's Property and Paid Into the State Treasury and Placed to the
Credit of the State Fair Association Maintenance Fund, Shall Not
Lapse at the End of a Biennium, But Be Continued Into the Next
Biennium: and Enacting a New Section to Be Known as Section 64-4-11,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Providing That the State Fair Association
Maintenance Fund Shall Be a Continuing Fund and Not Revert to the
General Fund of the State at the End of Any Biennium.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 64-4-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to read:
64-4-1. Powers of Utah State Fair Association—State Fair Association
Maintenance Fund a Continuing Fund—Exemption From Taxes.
The Utah State Fair Association is continued a body corporate with

